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Abstract
The fragmented approaches to delivering health care services in the United
States, along with the associated structural inefficiencies and unsustainable increases
in health care costs affecting all payers, compel the need for reform. Various federal
and state-level delivery system reform models have emerged in response.
The Medical Home (MH) is one of such reform models. In 2004 a national
initiative entitled “The Future for Family Medicine Project” identified the lack of
emphasis on comprehensive primary care, especially for chronic care patients, and
proposed the introduction of MHs to improve comprehensive primary care delivery
for every patient. Oregon’s MH variant, the Patient-Centered Primary Care Home
(PCPCH), was introduced in 2009 as part of a state-wide health reform initiative
ushered in by the passage of House Bill 2009 to promote the Triple Aim.
Since 2011, over 600 primary care clinics have been recognized as PCPCHs.
Proponents of the model argued that it will help improve comprehensive primary care
services upstream and reduce inappropriate utilization of Emergency Department
(ED) and Inpatient (IP) care and expenditures downstream. Evidence on the model’s
application to reduce ED and IP utilization and expenditures have so far been mixed
(Friedberg et al., 2014; Jackson & Williams, 2015; Baseman et al., 2016). Based on
growing interests in the effects of the model’s application to provide care for different
types of patients, this research was designed to evaluate the policy effects of the
application of PCPCHs, with a focus on PCPCHs that treat greater proportions of
chronic care patients, to answer the following questions:
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(1) What is the average chronic disease burden of PCPCHs, and how does their

average chronic disease burden compare to the communities PCPCHs are in
pre-post PCPCH recognition?
(2) How do primary care expenditures change based on the chronic disease

burden of PCPCHs?
(3) Do PCPCHs that engage more high chronic disease burden patients have more

reductions in ED and IP expenditures?
For this research, a chronic disease burden measure was developed from 10
markers of chronic conditions. This measure was then used to stratify PCPCH clinics
and their comparators into high and low chronic disease burden clinics. The research
was designed as a natural experiment, utilizing difference-in-difference methods to
measure outcome differences pre-post PCPCH policy implementation and comparing
outcome differences between PCPCHs and their control groups. The unit of analysis
was PCPCH clinics. The theoretical perspectives that informed this research were
Risk Selection and Complex Adaptive Systems (CAS). Data from Oregon’s All Payer
All Claims (APAC) data system, which included 16 quarters of claims and eligibility
data from fourth quarter 2010 to third quarter 2014, as well as PCPCH attestation data
on 525 clinics were utilized for this research.
The results suggest that the chronic disease burden for PCPCHs was
significantly lower than their comparator groups before clinics recognition as
PCPCHs, but the chronic disease burden did not change after clinics recognition as
PCPCHs. Average primary care expenditures did not change after PCPCH
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recognition. Average ED and average IP expenditures for high chronic disease burden
PCPCHs did not change but rather decreased significantly for low chronic disease
burden PCPCHs.
The results imply that the distribution of chronic disease burden in PCPCHs is
important and related to ED and IP expenditures, but in a different direction than
expected. The results also suggest that focusing on low chronic disease burden
patients in PCPCHs could help reduce ED and IP expenditures in the short and
medium terms. Policies to engage a broader mix of chronic disease burden patients in
PCPCHs could help increase savings from ED and IP utilization. The results also
suggest the need for more research to improve current understanding of how PCPCHs
are impacting health care trajectories in the current delivery system environment.
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Health Risks in Medical Homes and Their Effects on Emergency Department and
Inpatient Expenditures: A Focus on Patient-Centered Primary Care Homes in Oregon

Chapter 1: Introduction
“Health care today is marked by structural inefficiencies, unprecedented costs,
and fragmented care delivery, all of which place increasing pressure and burden on
individuals and families, providers, businesses, and entire communities. The
consequent health shortfalls are experienced across the whole population, but
disproportionately impact our most vulnerable citizens due to their complex health
and social circumstances” (Dzau et al., 2017).
While the effects of the above-mentioned problems on health care delivery
systems and outcomes have become almost passé, their direct and indirect impacts
compel reform to improve the organization, delivery, and payments for health care
services. Among the proposed reform models for improving the delivery and
outcomes of health care is the Medical Home (MH) model. This model focuses on
comprehensive primary care and the use of provider teams for coordinating and
integrating care continuously for all patients. This approach to care is expected to
improve comprehensive primary care upstream, especially for patients with chronic
physical and behavioral health conditions, thereby helping reduce downstream
demand for Emergency Department (ED) and Inpatient care (IP) utilization and
expenditures.
An environmental scan of the burden of chronic care in this country suggests
that the MH model’s approach to delivering care can be helpful: About 133 million
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people, including 10 percent of children and adolescents, are living with a minimum
of one chronic health condition (Kaiser Family Foundation [KFF], 2012, p. 6). In
Oregon, about 27 percent of the non-elderly population have chronic conditions
(Claxton, Cox, Damico, Levitt, & Pollitz, 2016). Chronic care is a significant driver
of health care expenditures because it manifests in disproportionate utilization of
health care resources. It is estimated that 84 percent of health care spending is driven
by patients with chronic conditions (Davis, Schoen, & Stremikis, 2010; Bipartisan
Policy Center [BPC], 2012). About 5 percent of the population with complex chronic
medical conditions account for 50 percent of total health care expenditures
(Anderson, 2010).
The Chronic Care Model (CCM) was introduced to help manage care for such
patients, and while some research suggests that the introduction of the CCM has
improved the management of chronic conditions (Wagner et al., 2001; Coleman,
Austin, Brach, & Wagner, 2009), the country’s changing demographic structure and
the association between aging and chronic health conditions suggest that the burden
of chronic care and its associated costs may continue to rise without support for
delivery models that emphasize upstream care through comprehensive primary care,
care coordination and integration, and the alignment of value-based payment systems
to incentivize such care as well as improve outcomes.
MHs and their variants are reform models that continue to gain national
attention and support for delivering such improvement in care and outcomes. In
Oregon, this model is referred to as the Patient-Centered Primary Care Home
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(PCPCH) model. At their core, PCPCHs emphasize the integration of comprehensive
primary care into health care delivery. Conceptually, the model is designed to deliver
patient-and family-centered care through continuously coordinating and integrating
care, along with value-based payments to incentivize integration across provider
teams (Rittenhouse, Thom, & Schmittdiel, 2010; Starfield, 2011). Proponents of
MH’s argue that such care will be beneficial for all patients, especially chronic
physical and behavioral health condition patients who need comprehensive primary
care through care coordination, integration, and continuity through relationships with
provider teams. Such upstream care is expected to reduce downstream utilization of
ED, IP care, and expenditures (Berwick, Nolan, & Whittington, 2008; Medicare
Payment Advisory Commission [MEdpAC], 2008; Oregon Health Authority [OHA],
2010; Peikes, Dale, Lundquist, Genevro, & Meyers, 2011).
The American Academy of Pediatrics (AAP) and the Institute of Medicine
(IOM) consider the model transformational for the delivery of quality patientcentered care: “Ultimately, system-wide changes will need to ensure high-quality
health care for all Americans; such changes should include taking steps to ensure that
every American has a personal MH” (Martin, Avant, & Bucholtz, 2004, p. S.3-4).
Almost all states in the United States currently have varying levels of integration and
emphasis on MH’s as part of broader health care delivery and payment reforms
(Takach, Gauthier, Sims-Kastelein, & Kaye, 2010). While it can be argued that the
MH model in theory can improve chronic care and reduce health care expenditures
through increased upstream use of primary care and reduced downstream use of ED
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and IP, the complex health care delivery system environment suggests that the
effectiveness of the model must be continuously evaluated to determine whether its
application continues to reduce ED and IP utilization and expenditures, and under
what conditions such improvements are realized.
The purpose of this research, therefore, is to evaluate the application of the
Patient-Centered Primary Care Homes (PCPCH) in Oregon with a focus on the
model’s application in practices with different mixes and types of chronic condition
patients. A chronic disease burden measure1 will be developed and used as a proxy
health-risk measure for this research, and it will be developed consistent with prior
health services literature on proxy health-risk measures (Ash & Ellis, 2012;
Hornbrook & Goodman,1996; Ash et al., 2000). Individual chronic disease burden
will be measured as the sum of 10 markers of chronic conditions. Primary care
practice level chronic disease burden will be measured as the average of practices’
patient-level chronic disease burden measures. The practice level measure will be
used to compare practices within their communities as well as to identify PCPCH
practices with higher versus lower average patient chronic disease burden. This
evaluation will specifically determine the relative effectiveness of the application of
PCPCHs, based on the average chronic disease burden of PCPCH practices, the
average primary care expenditures by chronic disease burden levels (high versus low)

1

The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention define chronic diseases as diseases that are
prolonged and not spontaneously resolved, and for which a complete cure is rarely achieved (CDCP,
2015). For this research, the diagnosis codes for 10 of such patient conditions are aggregated and
weighted to construct a chronic disease burden measure. The average chronic disease burden,
therefore, refers to the average of the 10 chronic conditions.
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in PCPCHs, and the average ED and average IP expenditures by chronic disease
burden levels (high versus low) of PCPCHs. The results of this research will
contribute to the broad-based evidence on the different implementations of the model,
and relative effectiveness of the model’s application to reduce ED and IP
expenditures, especially for chronic care patients.
Background
Cognizant of the unsustainable upward trajectory of health care costs as well
as the direct and indirect system pressures on state budget priorities, Oregon
embarked on a health system reform initiative to transform the organization, delivery,
and payment for health care services. Among the policy recommendations of the
state’s health care reform law (HB 2009) were emphasizing comprehensive primary
care and expanding access to primary care services through the PCPCH model, and
the use of coordinated care organizations (CCOs) as delivery platforms for integrating
care for all patients, including those in the Oregon Health Plan. These reforms were
designed to help promote the state’s Triple Aim: improved patient’s experience of
care, reduced per capita costs, and improved health of the state’s population (OHA,
2010).
Prior to HB 2009, the landscape of health care needs in the state suggested
that more than 1.5 million people (61 percent of adults) had at least one of the
following chronic conditions: arthritis, asthma, diabetes, heart disease, high blood
pressure, high cholesterol, or stroke. In addition, about 89 percent of Oregonian adults
had at least one of the following risk factors for the development of additional chronic
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conditions: current smoker; overweight or obese; or physically inactive (OHA, 2012).
Over $2.2 billion annually was spent on hospitalization for chronic care related health
issues, some of which for Ambulatory Care Sensitive Conditions (ACSC) (OHA,
2012). The growing number of patients with chronic physical and behavioral health
conditions suggested that coordinating and integrating primary care services in
PCPCHs could reduce downstream utilization, expenditures, and overall health care
costs.
The recognition of PCPCHs in Oregon began in October 2011; over 600
PCPCH clinics and providers have since been recognized as PCPCHs by the state
(OHA, 2012a). This model is being implemented as part of an integrated but stepwise plan to promote the state’s Triple Aim. The momentum for implementing
PCPCHs in Oregon was accelerated at the federal level by the passage of the Patient
Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA) in 2010, the Comprehensive Primary
Care Initiative (CPCI) in 2011, and the State Innovation Models grant in 2013 (OHA,
2013). These federal initiatives provided funding and technical assistance for
Oregon’s transformation efforts. Specifically, the PPACA provided incentives under
sections 2703 and 3502 for MHs, and for Health Homes for Medicaid recipients who
have at least two chronic conditions (PPACA, 2010). The step-wise approach to
health system transformation in Oregon culminated in the creation of CCOs to
coordinate care across different regions of the state; there are currently 15 recognized
CCOs in Oregon. CCOs’ capacity to effectively coordinate care at the community
level depends on working closely with PCPCHs and other primary care providers.
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Achieving the Triple Aim in Oregon will therefore depend on how well CCOs
coordinate care across PCPCHs and other provider settings to engage2 the state’s
Medicaid patients, i.e. Oregon Health Plan (OHP) patients, and reduce expenditures
associated with the overuse and misuse3 of ED and IP.
The available evidence on PCPCH recognition in the state suggests that
primary care clinics that have been recognized as PCPCHs are diverse. The clinics
vary based on their payer type, product mix, and geographic location. These
differences could influence the patient mix in PCPCH clinics. If we assume that most
health care encounters begin with primary care in ambulatory settings such as
PCPCHs, then the coordination and integration of care for patients who have chronic
conditions in PCPCHs will be effective in improving ED and IP utilization along with
their associated health care expenditures. Evaluating the average levels of patient
chronic conditions in PCPCHs in comparison to the communities they reside, and
their relationships to expected PCPCH outcomes such as reductions in ED and IP
expenditures, will provide important evidence regarding the relative effectiveness of
the model’s application.

2

Patient engagement broadly refers to the role of patients in their care, practice improvement, policy
design and implementation, and communications. For this research, engagement refers to the delivery
of appropriate and patient-centered primary care services.
3
Overuse and misuse are also referred to as inappropriate use in health services literature and in this
study. The terms refer to the use of emergency department and inpatient care services by patients
whose healthcare needs are non-urgent or could be appropriately treated or managed in primary care
settings. This definition recognizes that in some communities and in some instances, the shortage of
primary care providers and access to primary care services leaves patients with no options other than
the emergency department and inpatient care services.
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It can be argued from a systems perspective that coordinating and integrating
care in PCPCHs for patients who have chronic physical and behavioral health
conditions will be an effective approach to promoting the Triple Aim outcomes in
Oregon. While all patient populations can benefit from receiving care in PCPCHs,
patients who have various levels of chronic physical and behavioral conditions may
have more benefits (Patient-Centered Primary Care Collaborative, 2016; Pikes et al.,
2011). The focus of this research on the levels of chronic physical and behavioral
health conditions in PCPCH clinics will be important for evaluating this argument.
Statement of the Problem
Historical evidence suggests that MHs were first applied to the care of
children with special health care needs (Sia, Tonniges, Osterhus, & Toba, 2004;
Robert Graham Center, 2007; Epstein, Fiscella, Lesser, & Stange, 2010). The benefits
of the model led to renewed suggestions for its broad application. The mixed
evidence for the broad application of the model as part of ongoing delivery system
reforms around the country (Gunterman, 2007; Rittenhouse, Thom, & Schmittdiel,
2010), however, has compelled some researchers to argue for cautious approaches to
implementing the model (Fisher, 2008; Kilo & Wasson, 2010; Pikes et al., 2011).
Proponents of this view argue for more research evidence on the model’s application,
especially for different patient groups in different delivery systems and the
environmental impacts of the model’s applications. A recent evaluation of the
PCPCH model suggested the following among its conclusions: “[T]he analysis
indicates that, in most cases while the PCPCH attributes clearly influence cost and
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utilization measures, they rarely do so in ways that are independent and can be
attributed to a specific attribute; the cumulative effect of the PCPCH attributes has
more impacts than the independent effects” (Gelmon, Wallace, Sandberg, Petchel, &
Bouranis, 2016, p. 56).
The relationship between health risks and outcomes suggests that higher
health risks may be correlated to downstream expenditures through the overuse and
misuse of ED and IP (Frank, McGuire, & Newhouse, 1995; Reinhardt, 1998). The
emphasis on MHs is intended to help reduce such overuse and misuse of ED and IP
through effective care coordination and integration for patients who have chronic
physical and behavioral health conditions. Ascertaining the average chronic disease
burden of PCPCHs, along with the relationship between high and low chronic disease
burden PCPCHs and reductions in primary care (PC), ED, and IP expenditures, will
provide further insights into the relative effectiveness of the model’s application.
Evaluating the levels of health risks in PCPCHs is important because the
heterogeneity of health risks (Newhouse, 1996a, b) and the market-based approach to
providing health care services make risk selection possible in health care services
delivery. Risk selection in health care delivery is influenced by a delivery system
environment that is characterized by fragmentation in the organization, delivery, and
payment systems for health care (Arrow, 1963; Newhouse, 1996a). It can be inferred
that the potential benefits of the model’s application can be attenuated when providers
select risks or when payment incentives are not well aligned for PCPCHs to provide
care to patients whose health risks disproportionately drive health care expenditures.
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Risk selection can be positive or adverse when providers choose healthier or
sicker patients than the average population risk. Risk selection can be initiated by
patients or providers, but while risk selection in PCPCH has not been studied, the
complex and adaptive nature of the delivery system environment as well as the effects
of risk selection on outcomes and payment incentives for providers make it
imperative to investigate the levels of health risks in PCPCHs. The state-wide
implementation of PCPCHs provides opportunities for investigating the relative
effectiveness of the model’s application in Oregon.
Plesk (2001) argued that changes in the organization of health care delivery
occurs “in the zone of complexity and have nonlinear effects” (p.12) because of the
interactions among different system elements in the delivery environment. It can be
argued, by extension, that the relative effectiveness of the PCPCH model’s
application to reduce ED and IP expenditures may be affected by this zone of
complex interactions. The thesis of this research is that the relative effectiveness of
the PCPCH model’s application to reduce ED and IP expenditures will depend on
engaging patients whose chronic disease burden (chronic physical and behavioral
health conditions) disproportionately drive up utilization and expenditures.
Purpose and Significance of the Study
The main objectives of this relative effectiveness evaluation of PCPCHs are to
determine the following:
1. Does the average chronic disease burden in PCPCHs change pre-post

PCPCH recognition?
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2. Do primary care expenditures change based on the chronic disease burden

of PCPCHs?
3. Do PCPCHs that engage more high chronic disease burden patients have

more reductions in ED and IP expenditures?
This research will focus on short-term outcomes because of data concerns.
PCPCH recognition in Oregon commenced October 2011; therefore, the availability
of data will only permit a short-term study. Focusing on the short term is also
important because resource constraints and the competitive health care delivery
environment suggest that the transformational path and long-term sustainability of
any reforms, including those for PCPCHs, will depend on demonstrable short-term
improvements in containing or reducing health care costs. The results of this research
will therefore improve existing knowledge on the PCPCH model’s application. The
emphasis on practices’ average chronic disease burden levels, combined with how
average chronic disease burden levels affect short-term outcomes that policymakers
focus on to determine the relative effectiveness of PCPCHs, will help ascertain
whether PCPCHs that engage patients with a higher chronic disease burden achieve
more reductions in ED and IP expenditures. This is important because healthy
patients may have comparatively lower utilization, while patients who have higher
chronic physical and behavioral health conditions may have higher utilization (Davis,
Schoen, & Stremikis, 2010; BPC, 2012).
The evidence of risk selection in health care delivery and the effects of
selection on delivery system effectiveness (Frank, McGuire, & Newhouse, 1995)
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highlight this research’s importance. Because differences in chronic disease burden
levels may translate into differential utilization and expenditures, economic agents
such as health care providers may focus on low chronic disease burden patients. The
changing demographics of the state’s population and the growing proportion of
people living with chronic conditions suggest that reform models that do not engage
such patients may not be sustainable or value adding over time. Insights from this
research can further help determine whether chronic disease burden levels in PCPCHs
are a stable measure for evaluating the relative effectiveness of the model’s
application.
The results could also shape incentive policies for recognizing and rewarding
PCPCHs that engage health risks in proportion to their community presence. Most
importantly, this study can help guide state policymakers on whether and under what
conditions PCPCHs contribute to reducing ED and IP expenditures. Such evidence
will be important for policy decisions because effective system transformation will
require simultaneous reforms of delivery processes and payment mechanisms (Davis,
2007; Devers & Berenson, 2009; Luft, 2009).
Research Questions
This research proposes that engaging patients who have higher levels of
chronic physical and behavioral conditions in PCPCHs will be necessary for the
comparative effectiveness of the model’s application. Therefore, it will be important
to evaluate chronic disease burden levels in PCPCHs and the association between
high and low chronic disease burden levels and outcomes.
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The development of the chronic disease burden measure for this research will
be based on 10 markers of chronic conditions that persist and are different from acute
conditions. The 10 markers of chronic conditions are cardiovascular disease, chronic
heart failure, coronary heart disease, chronic kidney disease, asthma/COPD, diabetes,
obesity, affective disorder, other behavioral health, and schizophrenia. The chronic
disease burden measure will be developed consistent with prior health services
literature on proxy health risk measures (Ash & Ellis, 2012; Hornbook & Goodman,
1996; Ash et al., 2000). Individual chronic disease burden will comprise the sum of
the 10 markers of chronic conditions, while the average chronic disease burden of
PCPCH practices will comprise the average of PCPCH practices’ patient level
chronic disease burden measures. The average chronic disease burden measure will
be stratified into high and low average chronic disease burden levels and compared
pre-post PCPCH recognition to their respective non-PCPCH comparators.
This relative effectiveness research will explore the following three questions:
1. What is the average chronic disease burden of PCPCHs, and how does

their average chronic disease burden compare to the communities
PCPCHs are in pre-post PCPCH recognition?
2. How do primary care expenditures change based on the chronic disease

burden of PCPCHs?
3. Do PCPCHs that engage more high chronic disease burden patients have

more reductions in ED and IP expenditures?
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Theoretical Perspectives
The theories guiding the development of this research are Risk selection in
health care services delivery and considering the organization and delivery of health
care as Complex Adaptive Systems (CAS). The theory of selection postulates that
information asymmetry, heterogeneity of health risks, and the average-cost approach
to reimbursement make it economically beneficial for agents to select ‘good risks’
based on the health conditions of patients (Arrow, 1963; Newhouse, 1996; Reinhardt,
1998). Evidence on the chronic disease burden levels in PCPCHs will provide
insights on the engagement of chronic care patients in PCPCHs.
Health care delivery organizations including Medical Homes have been
characterized as Complex Adaptive Systems. CAS organizations self-organize and
adapt to changes based on internal models (rules) and signals from their environments
(Crabtree, McDaniel, Miller, & Stange, 1998; Litaker, Tomolo, Liberatore, Stange, &
Aron, 2006). Since most health care services are delivered in a ‘market-based’
environment, CAS suggests that PCPCHs will self-organize and adapt based on
incentive systems in the delivery environment. The location of PCPCH providers, the
level of health risks in their panels, and the primary care services offered will all be
important to evaluating how primary care clinics that become PCPCHs are adapting
to the policy changes. The results of this research will be analyzed from these
theoretical perspectives.
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Methodology
This research is a quantitative outcome study and will be based on a natural
experiment. Conceptually, the assignment to treatment and control groups in natural
experiments arises from changes to policies, programs, or laws, rather than a formally
randomized assignment to treatment and control groups. The effects of the exogenous
changes to policies and laws on specific outcomes are measured by comparing groups
that are affected (treatment) and unaffected (control) by such policy changes (Meyer,
1995). The effects of the implementation of PCPCHs in 2011 will be evaluated to
determine the relative effectiveness of this policy change on the increases or
decreases to Primary Care (PC) ED and IP expenditures. Economists use Differencein-Difference (D-in-D) methods to measure the exogenous variation from natural
experiments. Other disciplines classify D-in-D methods as before-and after-designs
with an untreated comparison group. D-in-D models will be developed to evaluate
chronic disease burden levels in PCPCHs and their comparators pre-post PCPCH
recognition; primary care expenditures by chronic disease burden levels in PCPCHs
and their comparators pre-post PCPCH recognition; and ED and IP expenditures by
chronic disease burden levels in PCPCHs and their comparators pre-post PCPCH
recognition.
The outcome variables of this research will be evaluated between PCPCHs
and their comparators: chronic disease burden levels (high versus low) of PCPCHs
and their comparator groups; average primary care expenditures by chronic disease
burden levels (high versus low) in PCPCH and their comparator groups; average ED
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and IP expenditures by chronic disease burden levels (high versus low) in PCPCHs
and their comparator groups. The case-matching variables for PCPCH comparators
will be age, gender, health insurance type, and zip code of patients. Each of these
variables will be weighted, aggregated, and used to construct PCPCH comparators.
The markers of chronic conditions in PCPCHs and their comparators will also be
weighted, aggregated, and split into high and low average chronic disease burden
groups for this research.
The intervention group will comprise recognized PCPCHs, while the
comparator groups will be constructed both from non-PCPCH primary care clinics in
the state and from stratifying PCPCHs into high and low chronic disease burden
PCPCHs. Primary care clinics that applied for PCPCH recognition but were not
recognized as well as clinics currently applying for PCPCH recognition will be
excluded from this study. The pre-policy period will comprise data on primary care
patients in 2011, while the post-policy periods will comprise data from the first wave
of PCPCH recognition (2012 to 2014). The following data sets will be used for this
research: The All Payer All Claims (APAC) and PCPCH attestation data. Oregon’s
APAC data system provides complete and standardized patients’ de-identified data on
health care claims and eligibility from private, public, and third-party health plans and
payers, including pharmacy claims and demographic information (Love, Custer, &
Miller, 2010). Data from the PCPCH program will include practice-level data on
PCPCH attestation.
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Chapter 2: Review of the Literature
History of the Medical Home Model
Medical Homes (MH) by design are patient-centered, relationship-based
health care delivery models that emphasize comprehensive primary care and the
management of chronic conditions. The National Committee on Quality Assurance
(NCQA) defines MHs as delivery models in which “patients establish ongoing
relationships with personal physicians who lead teams at single locations and take
collective responsibility for patient care, providing for the patients’ health care needs
and arranging for appropriate care with other qualified providers” (NCQA, 2011, p.
2).
Conceptually, the model emphasizes patient-centered approaches to
empowering primary care provider teams to cultivate relationships with patients; use
their knowledge and understanding of patients’ health statuses, which have been
developed over time to prevent diseases; detect diseases earlier; and coordinate and
integrate care for patients. The evidence suggests that this approach to care reduces
inappropriate (overuse and misuse) of ED and IP and improves the overall health of
patients (Berwick, Nolan, & Whittington, 2008; Berry & Mirabito, 2009; Starfield &
Shi, 2004; Stange et al., 2010; Fisher, 2008; Glasgow et al., 2002). The model
emerged around 1967 as part of the American Academy of Pediatrics care guidelines
for patients who have special health care needs. During that time, MHs served as
central locations for the storage and timely retrieval of patient information (Sia,
Tonniges, Osterhus, & Taba, 2004; Robert Graham Center, 2007). Due to the relative
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effectiveness of the model since introduction, a national initiative in 2004, “The
Future for Family Medicine Project,” which was supported by the American
Academy of Physicians (AAP), the Institute of Medicine (IOM), and other primary
care provider groups, identified the lack of emphasis on comprehensive primary care
and began advocating for the broader application of the MH model. The renewed
emphasis on MHs in 2004 was based on strengthening primary care delivery as part
of broader health care delivery system reforms.
The MH model has been supported by various health policy proposals:
Section 204 of the Tax Relief and Health Care Act of 2006 and the 2010 Patient
Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA) provided guidelines for the model’s
implementation around the country to improve the quality of care, reduce overutilization of ED and IP, and reduce associated health care costs (PPACA, 2010;
Collaborative, P.C.P.C., 2007). Variants of the model since 2004 have been
introduced in different states, in different delivery systems, by different payers, and
for different population groups. At the core of the model are the following attributes:
patient-centered relationships, team-based approach to care, comprehensive primary
care, chronic disease management, and payment reforms to incentivize care
coordination and integration. The model continues to gain broad support around the
country based on the relative effectiveness of its application. Some states have
implemented variants of the model as part of their health care delivery system
reforms, but there are differences in the model’s implementation. Among the
differences are semantics, accreditation and recognition, measurement, and
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population focus. Semantically, the model is referred to in some implementations as
MHs, Health Homes, Primary Care Homes, or Patient-Centered Primary Care Homes.
Recognition and accreditation of the model’s implementation have been from
states or national accreditation organizations such as National Committee on Quality
Assurance (NCQA) and the Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality (AHRQ).
Measurement thus far has been based on short-term measures policymakers focus on
for policy decisions, such as ED and IP utilization and expenditures and health care
costs. The population focus also includes pediatrics, including children who have
special health care needs, adult patients, chronic care patients, and homeless patient
populations.
Based on the focus of this research, this chapter will broadly review literature
on two core tenets of the model: primary care and chronic disease management and
the different applications of the model and their respective outcomes. The following
themes and headings will guide the literature review: the history and landscape of the
model’s application; the variations of the model; Oregon’s Patient-Centered Primary
Care Home (PCPCH) model; the main components of Oregon’s model and how
PCPCHs relate to other MH models; evidence of improvements in PC, ED, IP, and
health care costs; outcomes from the application of the model; the importance of
health risks to the model’s application and why this study focuses on evaluating
health risks in PCPCHs; the theoretical lens for thinking about health risks and
outcomes in PCPCHs; and how the theories help explain the model’s application and
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potential research results. This chapter will conclude by restating the research
questions and hypotheses.
The Patient-Centered Medical Home (PCMH) Model
The Patient-Centered Medical Home (PCMH) model is often referred to as
MH in the literature. Historically, the endorsement of the Joint Principles of the
PCMH model in 2007 by AAP, IOM, and other physician groups was important to
the model’s reintroduction because it helped establish a consensus of standards for the
model’s implementation across the country. The Joint Principles established the
following framework for the model’s application:
•

Patients having ongoing relationships with personal physicians

•

Physician directed medical practice

•

Whole person orientation of care

•

Care coordination and integration

•

Emphasis on quality and safety

•

Enhanced access for patients

•

Payment reforms to recognize value added patient care

The evidence suggests that in addition to the semantic differences in how the
model is described, there are other differences in how the model has been
implemented, including performance measurement and recognition/certification of
the model. The following are specific, but not exhaustive examples of
implementations of the model in different delivery systems and settings:
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Closed organizational systems: The Veteran’s Administration - Patient
Aligned Care Teams (PACTs) (Hebert, P. L., Liu, C. F., Wong, E. S., Hernandez, S.
E., Batten, A., Lo, S., … Fihn, S. D. (2014); Nelson, K. M., Helfrich, C., Sun, H.,
Hebert, P. L., Liu, C.-F., Dolan, E., … Hernandez, S. E. (2014); Yoon, J., Liu. C.F.,
Lo, J., Schectman, G., Stark, R., Rubenstein, L.V., & Yano, E.M (2015).
Private Health Maintenance Organizations (HMOs): Geisinger Health
System PCMH (ProvenHealth Navigator) (Maeng, D.D., Khan, N., Tomcavage, J.,
Graf, T.R., Davis, D.E., & Steele, G.D (2015).
Vulnerable and underserved populations: Sugerman, J.R., Phillips, K.E.,
Wagner, E.H., Coleman, K., & Abrams, M.K (2014).
Chronic care patients: Neal, J., Chawla, R., Colombo, C.M., Snyder, R.L., &
Nigam, S (2015).
All classes of patients in different states: in Oregon (Rissi, J., Gelmon, S.,
Saulino, E., Merrithew, N., Baker, R., & Hatcher, P (2015); Gelmon, S., Wallace, N.,
Sandberg, B., Petchel, S., & Bouranis, N (2016); in Vermont (Jones, C., Finison, K.,
McGraves-Lloyd, K., Tremblay, T., Mohlman, K.M., Tanzman, B., Hazard, M.,
Maier, S., & Samuelson, J (2015)); in multi-states (Nielsen, M., Buelt, L., Patel, K.,
& Nichols, L. M (2016).
The model has also been implemented using various traditional and alternative
value-based payment incentives. Among the examples of such implementations
include:
Single payers: VA’s PACTs (Randall, l., Mohr, D.C., & Maynard, C (2014)).
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Fee-For-Service (FFS) only payments: (Pines, J.M., Keyes, V., Van Hasselt,
M., & McCall, N. (2015)).
Mixed payments: (FFS, per member per month services (PMPM), shared
savings and other forms of incentive arrangements) (Rosenthal, M.B., Alidina, S.,
Friedberg, M.W., Singer, S.J., Eastman, D., Li, Z., & Schneider, E.C. (2016)).
Measurement and performance: Most MH implementations have focused
on measuring utilization and expenditures based on the main measures that
policymakers focus on when they evaluate the relative effectiveness of the model’s
application, such as ED, IP, PC, costs (per member per month services [PMPM], total
costs of care, and expenditures) Gelmon, S., Wallace, N., Sandberg, B., Petchel, S., &
Bouranis, N (2016). Other evaluations focus on the level of “medical homeness”
Lemak, C.H., Nahra, T.A., Cohen., G.R., Erb N.D., Paustian, M.L., Share, D., &
Hirth, R.A (2015).
Certification/accreditation. There are currently four main national and
various state-level accreditation bodies. The national organizations are the
Accreditation Association for Ambulatory Health Care, the Joint Commission, the
National Committee on Quality Assurance (NCQA), and the Utilization Review and
Accreditation Commission. Oregon, Colorado, Massachusetts, Pennsylvania,
Vermont, and Minnesota are among states that have developed state-level
recognition/accreditation standards.
In addition to emphasizing PCMH demonstrations around the country, the
Affordable Care Act also supported Health Home (HHs) demonstrations. HHs are
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variants of MHs and are defined as population-based health care delivery models for
coordinating and integrating physical and behavioral care for chronic condition
patients in Medicaid (PPACA, 2010). According to section 1945(h) of the Act, HH
populations must comprise patients who have the following health risks: “at least two
chronic conditions; one chronic condition and at risk for a second health condition;
patients who have ‘serious and persistent mental health conditions’” (p. 8). Though
MHs and HHs are similar in their implementation goals and intended outcomes, the
models are different in several areas that need to be delineated for clarity.
Conceptually, the two models (MHs and HHs) are similar in their organization
around the Joint Principles, emphasis on comprehensive primary care and prevention,
care coordination and integration, chronic disease management, interdisciplinary team
care, relationship-centered care, and payment reforms to incentivize comprehensive
chronic care. Their main differences, highlighted in Table 2.1, are population focus,
provider requirements, and emphasis on care coordination and integration across
physical and behavioral health conditions. Health Homes tend to focus on Medicaid
patients who have various levels of chronic conditions. The emphasis on care
coordination and integration across physical and behavioral health conditions is
intended to improve the quality of patient care and outcomes. Health Homes are also
recognized by state Medicaid agencies. In contrast, PCMHs are recognized by both
state agencies and national accreditation agencies. Both models use payment
incentives, but the incentives are structured differently to reflect different patient
needs and primary care improvement priorities for states using these models.
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Table 2.1
Primary Differences between Patient-Centered Medical Homes and Health Homes

Patient Population(s)

Patient-Centered Medical Homes
Health Homes
Provides care to all patient
Provides care to individuals with various levels of
populations across their life spans. approved chronic conditions.

Main Providers

Typically defined as physician-led
primary care practices, but also midlevel providers such as nurse
practioners.

May include primary care practices, community
mental health centers and organizations,
addiction treatment centers and providers,
Federally Qualified Health Centers, Health Home
agencies, and other chronic care providers.

Payer Types

All payers, including Medicaid,
commercial insurance, and private
payers.

Currently a Medicaid-only construct.

Organization of Care
Delivery

Team-based and whole person
Team-based and whole person orientation with a
orientation with a focus on
strong focus on coordinating and integrating
coordinating primary care services, behavioral health care that includes substance
including referral and tracking,
abuse treatment, social and family support, and
treatment guideline adherence,
other services such as nutrition, home health care,
electronic prescription, and provider- and transitional care.
patient communication.

Technology Use

Health Information Technology for
coordinating and integrating care
across the continuum of care,
including referrals.

Health Information Technology for coordinating
and integrating care and services across the
continuum of care, including in-home care such
as remote monitoring in patient homes.

Provider Requirements

State Medicaid and National
Committee on Quality Assurance
determined.

State Medicaid agency determined.

Incentive Systems

Alternative and bundled payments Per Member Per Month payments for required
usually based on Per Member Per
services, as well as for care coordination and
Month comprehensive care designed integration.
to improve the value of care.

Source: Smith (2011).

While various states have implemented variants of HHs or PCMHs or both, it
can be argued based on its design and implementation that Oregon’s Patient-Centered
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Primary Care Homes (PCPCH) is a hybrid model that attempts to integrate both HHs
and MHs to provide care for the state’s entire population and includes all provider
and payer groups in the state. The next section of this chapter will review Oregon’s
PCPCHs and the differences between PCPCHs and other state level models.
Oregon’s Patient-Centered Primary Care Home (PCPCH) Model
PCPCHs emerged from a legislative initiative for broader health system
transformation in the state (HB 2009). The state’s health care agency, the Oregon
Health Authority (OHA), began recognizing PCPCHs in 2011. It was projected that at
least 75 percent of the state’s population would receive their health care services in
PCPCHs by 2015 (OHA, 2010). Since November 2011 over 600 primary care
providers have been recognized as PCPCHs with more providers in line for
recognition. Over 100 of the state’s PCPCHs have also been cross-recognized by the
NCQA (NCQA, 2014). Oregon’s PCPCH recognition standards were developed
through a state-level consensus process, but the standards are based on the Joint
Principles framework and the NCQA national standards. Among Oregon’s core
recognition standards are comprehensive primary care, care coordination and
integration for chronic care patients, quality improvement, and the delivery of patientand family-centered care. The development and use of state level recognition
standards helped emphasize state-level priorities for transforming primary care
delivery. Table 2.2 lists the main components of NCQA and Oregon’s PCPCH
recognition standards.
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Table 2.2
Primary Standards for Patient-Centered Medical Home Certification

NCQA
Enhance Access and Continuity of Care

PCPCH
Access to Care

Identify and Manage Patient Populations

Accountability for Patient Care

Plan and Manage Care

Comprehensive Care

Provide Self-Care and Community Support

Continuity of Care

Track and Coordinate Care

Care Coordinate and Integration

Measure and Improve Performance

Patient and Family-Centered Care

Source: (OHA, 2013; NCQA, 2011)

It can be inferred from Table 2.2 that the standards are similar. Both PCPCHand NCQA-recognized Medical Homes are tiered based on attestation to standards
met and performance improvements after initial attestation. The tier system is based
on numerical weights attached to each attestation standard. Clinics that apply for
recognition must attain a minimum score to be recognized at tier 1; higher than
minimum scores qualify clinics into higher tiers. For example, in addition to 10
“must-pass” standards for all PCPCH tiers, tier 1 clinics must achieve an aggregate
between 30 and 60 points, tier 2 between 65 and 125, while tier 3 requires at least 130
points. Oregon has recently introduced additional tiers for high performing clinics
such as tier 3-star, tier 4 and tier 5 or higher (OHA, 2013).
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PCPCH and other Medical Home Models.
While all states and delivery systems have implemented variants of MHs and
HHs (Takach, Gauthier, Sims-Kastelein, & Kaye, 2010), it can be inferred from the
evidence that most models are, by their design and intended outcomes, more similar
than different. Stange et al. (2010) corroborates this inference with their argument
that all MH models contain four main elements: comprehensive primary care, new
ways for organizing health care delivery, strengthening practices internal capacities to
provide effective care, and different incentives for health care delivery. A comparison
between Oregon and NCQA (most-used recognition standards) from Table 2.2
confirms Stange et al.’s (2010) argument that the models are more similar than
different. Among the broad differences are the emphasis on model components, the
focus on different population groups, the structure of enhanced provider payments,
the choice of provider recognition through standards developed at the state or national
levels (or both), and the weighting of the recognition standards.
Even though there are different state-level recognition standards for MHs and
HHs, most recognition agencies emphasize and allocate the most points to the
following standards: care integration and coordination for patients with various levels
of chronic physical and behavioral health conditions, Health Information Technology
(HIT) use for care coordination and care management purposes, patient engagement,
and quality improvement. The differences are revealed in the differential point
allocation to different model elements, the choice for state-developed or national
agency recognition standards, and their intended outcomes. Oregon and NCQA
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recognition classify clinics into tiers but use different weighting. For example, while
the weights for tier 1 clinics are similar, the total weights for qualifying into tier 2 and
tier 3 for PCPCH clinics are between 65 and 125, and 130 and up, respectively.
However, NCQA’s requirements for tier 2 and tier 3 are between 60 and 80, and 85
and 100, respectively (OHA, 2010; NCQA, 2012). The weights for care coordination,
integration, and patient engagement are similar for both models. To recognize
adaptations of the model and to appropriately align incentives, Oregon has recently
increased the tier ratings for PCPCH clinics to recognize higher performing PCPCHs.
PCPCH clinics can now receive tier 4 and tier 5-star ratings in Oregon.
PCPCH and other States’ Medical Home Programs.
At the core of Oregon’s PCPCH model is the goal of improving the delivery
of comprehensive and patient-centered primary care services and the management of
various levels of chronic conditions upstream, especially for Medicaid patients.
Different levels of enhanced payments are used to encourage teams of providers
across the care continuum to comprehensively coordinate and integrate care for
patients, especially those who have various levels of chronic physical and behavioral
health conditions. While most Medical Homes are similar in design, there are inherent
differences in their applications and outcomes. Comparing Oregon’s PCPCH model
to similarly designed state-level Patient-Centered Medical Home (PCMH) models,
namely Colorado, North Carolina, Minnesota, Vermont, Oklahoma, Massachusetts,
and Pennsylvania reveal differences such as the varying emphases on the model’s
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application, patient focus, and use of payment incentives for care coordination and
integration.
Oregon vs. Colorado. Colorado’s program, begun in 2009, differs from
Oregon’s PCPCH in terms of population focus and payer types. Colorado has a
single-payer program for the state’s high health-risk children enrolled in Medicaid or
the children’s health insurance program (CHIP) (Colorado Department of Health Care
Policy, 2012). Colorado’s program also uses both state and NCQA recognition
standards. Oregon’s PCPCH, on the other hand, focuses on providing care to all
patient population groups in the state, with a specific emphasis on Medicaid
populations, but the model is applied across all payer groups. Unlike Oregon’s
multiple tier levels, MHs in Colorado are recognized under a single tier (Takach,
2011).
Oregon vs. North Carolina. Community Care of North Carolina (CCNC), one
of the oldest programs in the country, is North Carolina’s MH variant. The program
began in 1998 and was incrementally developed into a state-level MH for managing
chronic conditions. It is estimated that 80 percent of Medicaid patients, comprising
about 10 percent of the state’s population who are considered high risk because of
their chronic conditions, receive care from CCNC (Steiner et al., 2008). The
recognition of practices in CCNC is based on NCQA standards (Trapp, 2010). CCNC
is like Oregon’s PCPCH in its program design and recognition standards but different
in its approach to recognizing clinics and patient focus. Unlike Oregon, CCNC uses
NCQA recognition standards and focuses primarily on chronic care patients.
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Oregon vs. Minnesota. Minnesota’s Health Care Home program started in
2010. Health Care Homes are like PCPCHs in their design, recognition, and
population focus. Both programs use multi-payers and state-developed recognition
standards, and both focus on all patients. Minnesota’s program, however, is different
because all providers qualify under a single tier, while patients are stratified into
“complexity tiers” based on their number of chronic conditions. There are currently
five distinct complexity tiers. As part of this patient stratification process for
payments, clinics that coordinate and integrate physical and behavioral health care for
high-risk patients who have multiple chronic conditions receive additional enhanced
payments (Minnesota Department of Health [MDH] 2012). Minnesota’s model
currently pays the highest enhanced payments for care coordination, between $10.14
and $79.05 (Takach, 2011). On the other hand, comprehensive payments for PCPCHs
vary by payers. It ranges between $10 and $25 for the Center for Medicare and
Medicaid (CMS) payments, which are discriminated upon based on practice tier
levels (PCPCH, 2013). These amounts are based on available information; because
payment rates are adjusted periodically, the amounts may change over time.
Oregon vs. Vermont. Vermont’s Blueprint for Health (BPH) was launched in
2006 as part of the CMS multi-payer Advanced Primary Care Practice demonstration.
BPH is similar in design and scope to PCPCH. For example, both programs provide
care to all populations, use multi-payers, and provide enhanced provider payments for
care coordination and integration. BPH is different in the use of NCQA recognition
and multidisciplinary community health teams to provide care for a panel of 20,000
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patients in each of its three rural demonstration settings (Bielaszka-DuVernay, C.
2011).
Oregon vs. Oklahoma. Oklahoma’s Patient Centered Medical Home (PCMH)
SoonerCare Choice delivery program began in 2009 and focused on improving the
delivery of comprehensive primary care as a strategy for containing health care costs
in the state. Like Oregon’s PCPCH program, Oklahoma classifies PCMH providers
into three tier levels but with different classifications: entry, advanced and optimal.
SoonerCare choice and PCPCH are similar in other areas as well. Both programs use
value-based payment incentives to incentivize care coordination and integration.
Payment incentives are differentiated based on provider tier levels, both programs are
based on state developed recognition standards, and focus on all patients, especially,
beneficiaries of Medicaid (Takach, 2011).
Oregon vs. Massachusetts. The Patient-Centered Medical Home Initiative
(PCMHI) in Massachusetts began in 2009 with 46 primary care providers including
community health centers. The PCMHI program was designed to reduce
fragmentation in care delivery and health care costs by focusing on the following:
behavioral health integration into primary care and chronic disease management.
Massachusetts PCMHI is like Oregon’s PCPCH program in terms of their use of a
mixture of payment incentives to coordinate and integrate care for patients. But the
PCMHI program is different in terms of accreditation - a mix of state developed and
NCQA standards. PCMHI providers are also not differentiated based on practice tier
levels (Cabral, Sefton, & Anderson, 2013).
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Oregon vs. Pennsylvania. The Pennsylvania Chronic Care Initiative (PCCI), a
state-level MH variant, began in 2009 as a collaborative initiative by the state’s
largest commercial health plans and Medicaid-managed care plans for 32 main
medical practices in the state. Practices were recognized as Patient-Centered Medical
Homes (PCMH) based on NCQA standards, with financial support from the state for
practice recognition. The PCCI initiative was focused on improving the care for
chronic care patients. PCCI is like Oregon’s PCPCH program in their use of valuebased payment incentives for coordinating and integrating care and their state-level
implementation and support. But PCCI is different in its focus on chronic care
patients and use of NCQA accreditation standards.
Summary. It can be inferred broadly from the sampling of MH applications
in different states that the applications of the model are similar but different in other
areas. All models emphasize primary care, use of the chronic care model for
comprehensive care coordination and integration, and alignment of payment
incentives to ensure that providers focus on health risks that drive utilization and
expenditures. Proponents of the model argued that emphasizing the above elements in
health care delivery may improve care and outcomes by engaging patients who have
chronic conditions and whose utilization disproportionately drive up expenditures
(Fisher, 2008; Abrams, Davis, & Haran, 2009; Berwick & Hackbarth, 2012).
While preliminary evidence from variants of the model’s application in
different delivery systems and states suggests improvements in some process and
outcomes metrics of care (specific examples are provided below), the levels of health
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risks in MHs have not been studied. The results of this research will provide
important contributions to this field in terms of levels of high chronic disease burden
patients enrolled in PCPCHs and other MHs. Evaluating chronic disease burden
levels in PCPCHs and the association between high chronic disease burden PCPCHs
and ED and IP expenditures will provide insights into the relative effectiveness of the
application of the model.
Evidence of Improvements in Cost-Sensitive Outcomes of Care
Bending the trajectory of health care expenditure growth is one of the Triple
Aim and a goal of PCPCH implementation and health care reforms in general. MHs
are important in achieving health reform goals because of the expectations that
providing comprehensive primary care and disease management upstream in
ambulatory settings will reduce the pressure on overuse and misuse of ED and IP
utilization. Most evaluations of the model have thus far focused on measuring short
term improvements in ED and IP use (Rittenhouse, Thom & Schmittdiel, 2010).
While the focus on short-term improvements are necessitated in part by the short-term
history of the model’s application and the availability of data, it can be argued that the
model’s long-term sustainability will depend on demonstrable short-term
improvements. This research will therefore focus on the chronic disease burden of
PCPCHs and short-term improvements in ED and IP use.
The next section will review cost-sensitive outcomes from the main elements
of the model, namely primary care and the chronic care model. While there are other
elements of the model that are associated to improved outcomes, this review focuses
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on primary care and the chronic care model because they are foundational to all
applications of the model across delivery systems. This section will also review
evidence of the application of the model for different population groups: pediatric and
adult populations, those in Integrated Delivery Systems (IDS), and those in the
following state-level programs: North Carolina, Vermont, Colorado, Minnesota,
Oklahoma, Massachusetts, and Pennsylvania. While variants of Medical Home
initiatives are operational around the country (Hing, Kurtzman, Lau, Taplin, &
Bindman, 2017), the afore mentioned state-level Medical Home programs were
selected based on the following criteria: the early adoption and implementation of the
model in those states; the use of state-developed recognition standards, or a mixture
of state-developed and NCQA recognition standards; and the use of multi payer
provider payment incentives. The evidence from these state-level programs is
therefore not representative of all state programs or MH implementations.
The Cost-Sensitive Benefits of Primary Care.
Providing comprehensive primary care for patients with various levels of
chronic physical and behavioral health conditions adds value because the elements of
primary care, such as accessibility, care coordination, integration, and appropriate
referrals, have been found to reduce the overuse and misuse of ED and IP utilization.
Shi and Singh (2008) posited that “an ideal system of health care delivery ought to
have a strong primary care base, and for the system to be effective, primary care
should be closely integrated with adequate and timely specialized services” (p. 249).
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Accordingly, most MH models, including PCPCHs, emphasize comprehensive
primary care.
Empirically, Basu, Friedman and Burstin (2004) found that patients in private
Health Maintenance Organizations (HMOs) who received well-coordinated primary
care services had consistently higher reductions in preventable hospitalizations than
patients who received uncoordinated primary care services in private Fee-For-Service
(FFS) only programs. In their study on Medicaid patients in Colorado who received
care from Federally Qualified Health Centers (FQHCs) and from private FFS
providers, Rothkopf, Brookler, Wadhwa, & Sajovetz (2011) found that primary care
in FQHCs resulted in less IP and ED utilization than in FFS systems.
In Oregon, a study on the expansion of primary care through the Oregon
Health Plan (OHP) found that “preventable hospitalization rates varied inversely with
access to primary care but correspondingly with access to hospital care” (Saha,
Solotaroff, Oster, & Bindman, 2007, p. 717). This evidence suggests that increasing
access to primary care reduced the incidence of preventable hospitalizations. The
evidence further supports the association between the receipt of primary care and
improved ED and IP utilization. Maeng et al. (2012) found that Geisinger Health
System’s dual approach to expanding primary care access and integrating primary
care services across various levels of care for chronic care patients improved
utilization and patient outcomes: “[M]oving resources further “upstream” to primary
care settings reduced “downstream” costs from highest acuity settings” (p.150).
Several other studies corroborate the association between comprehensive primary
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care and reduced ED and IP utilization (Epstein, 2001; Falik et al., 2005; Franks,
Cameron, & Bertakis, 2003).
Improving the Value of Primary Care. Despite the association between the
receipt of primary care and improved outcomes, primary care has historically been
less emphasized in health care delivery. This primary care ‘chasm’ has arguably
contributed to the overuse, misuse, and underuse of health care services, along with
rising health expenditures (Safran, Tarlov, & Rogers, 1994; The Commonwealth
Fund, 2012; Berry & Mirabito, 2009; Davis, Schoen, & Stremikis, 2010). Among the
arguments for under-emphasizing primary care included the supply of the primary
care workforce and the cost-effectiveness of primary care and prevention.
Opponents of MHs have cited these and other arguments as reasons for not
supporting an expanded application of the model. They argue that shortages in the
primary care workforce will exacerbate workforce burnout and contribute to
worsening outcomes (Berenson & Rich, 2010; Bernstein, Chollet, Peikes, & Peterson,
2010). But the evidence from the model’s application suggests that the use of primary
care teams working collaboratively with primary care physicians (PCPs) in MHs can
improve patient care and outcomes (Sylvia, 2008; Bodenheimer, Chen, & Bennett,
2009). Other evidence suggests that while the supply of PCPs can be improved,
arguments about PCP shortages are overstated because current primary care
workforce levels are adequate to sustain health care production in MHs: “[I]nvesting
in a major expansion of the physician workforce is a distraction from what has
already been shown to be effective” (Goodman & Grumbach, 2008, p. 337).
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While improving the supply of PCPs will be useful, it can be inferred that the
use of primary care teams would sustain the model’s workforce needs. Regarding the
cost-effectiveness of primary care and prevention, a core argument by opponents is
the cost-effectiveness of providing preventive care to people who may never be
afflicted by the conditions for which they receive preventive care. In their study on
hypertension care, Weinstein & Stason (1976) suggested that the aggregate costs of
prevention services were often greater than their accrued benefits in Quality Adjusted
Life Years (QALY). Russell (1986) and Cohen, Neumann, & Weinstein (2008) also
suggested that some prevention services were associated with increased medical
spending.
Providing effective primary care in PCPCHs, however, can be cost-effective
and cost-saving. Goetzel (2009), Russell (2009), and Enthoven, Crosson, & Shortell
(2007) all emphasized the important benefits of primary care and prevention. Goetzel
(2009) argued that opponents of prevention fail to separate the different types of
preventive care (primary, secondary and tertiary) and their respective benefits. He
posited that “pitted against the cost of medical treatment, prevention offers a good
return on investment” (p. 38). Russell (2009) observed that “prevention can be cost
effective and sometimes cost saving components of managing established chronic
conditions” (p. 44). Enthoven, Crosson, & Shortell (2007) emphasized the
“interdependencies” in health care delivery to support their argument that care
coordination and integration for chronic care patients in primary care settings
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improves health care value by reducing patient demand and use of relatively
expensive ED and IP utilization.
It can be inferred from the above evidence on primary care that
comprehensive primary care can add value because primary prevention can
proactively reduce the incidence of some chronic conditions, while secondary and
tertiary care can help manage diseases more cost-effectively. An environmental scan
of health care needs underscores this assertion. It is estimated that 157 million
Americans will be living with at least one chronic condition by 2020. The number of
people who will be living with multiple chronic physical and behavioral health
conditions is also expected to grow from 63 million in 2005 to about 81 million by
2020 (Wu & Green, 2000).
This growing incidence and prevalence of chronic conditions supports the
potential benefits and value of integrating comprehensive primary into MHs.
Emphasizing comprehensive primary care in MHs can help engage patients whose
health risks predispose them to higher health care utilization and expenditures. The
growing burden of chronic conditions also suggests the importance of a
comprehensive and integrated approach to managing chronic conditions in MHs. The
next section will focus on the management of chronic conditions and the use of the
chronic care model for chronic disease management.
The Cost-Sensitive Outcomes from Chronic Disease Management
Historically, several chronic disease management programs have been applied
to managing chronic diseases, namely the report card initiative, chronic disease
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management by private companies (CDMC), and the Chronic Care Model (CCM).
The report card initiative became ineffective shortly after introduction (Marshall,
Shekelle, Leatherman, & Brook, 2000). CDMCs provided care for single chronic
conditions in patients’ homes through nurse visits, health education, and the use of
various health information technologies (HIT) to support this care process (Cassalino,
2005). The CCM, on the other hand, is considered a generic model that integrates
evidence-based elements of primary care, self-management education, HIT, and team
care for managing chronic conditions (Coleman, Austin, Brach, & Wagner, 2009).
Chronic Disease Management Companies (CDMC). The evidence for the
comparative effectiveness of CDMCs is mixed. While programs have demonstrated
improvements in some patient outcomes, most of the contributions to reduced ED and
IP use have not been statistically significant (Ouwens, Wollersheim, Hermens,
Hulscher, & Grol, 2005). A comprehensive review of CMS FFS programs since 1999
revealed that while CDMC programs improved patient behavior, quality of care, and
patient satisfaction, only 20 percent of their programs achieved reductions in IP use or
projected cost targets (Bott, Kapp, Johnson, & Magno, 2009). Other evaluations
arrived at similar conclusions. For example, studies on congestive heart failure
(CHF), chronic obstructive pulmonary disease (COPD), asthma, diabetes, and
depression all corroborated the improvements in quality of care but suggested that the
improvements did not translate into significant ED and IP use and health care costs
(Vogeli et al., 2007; Mattke, Seid, & Ma, 2007; Coleman, Austin, Brach, & Wagner,
2009). Based on their meta-analysis of CDMC initiatives, Mattke, Seid, & Ma (2007)
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concluded that “support for population-based disease management is more an article
of faith than a reasoned conclusion grounded in well researched facts” (p. 675). This
conclusion was corroborated by a Congressional Budget Office analysis on CDMCs
(CBO, 2004).
The Chronic Care Model (CCM). The CCM has been used in health care
delivery since the 1980s. The model is based on a process of care improvements for
chronic care patients at the practice level. The elements of CCM that are associated to
improved outcomes of care include multidisciplinary teams (Coleman, Austin, Brach,
& Wagner, 2009); self-management support (Bodenheimer, MacGregor, & Sharifi,
2005); and HIT (Sperl-Hillen et al., 2004). The evidence suggests that implementing
elements of the CCM improved care processes and some outcomes of care, for
example, lipid-lowering and angiotensin-converting enzymes for CHF patients, and
ED and IP utilization (Asch et al., 2005; Sochalski et al., 2009; Pearson et al., 2005;
Fireman, Bartlett, & Selby, 2004; Russell, Orleans, Wagner, Curry, & Solberg, 2001);
and QALY for diabetes and asthma care in several delivery settings (Huang et al.,
2007; Eddy, Schlessinger, & Kahn, 2005; Brown, Peikes, & Chen, 2007; Gunterman,
2007). Among other improvements from implementing the CCM included lowering
the risk of cardiovascular disease in diabetes patients (Glasgow et al., 2002; Vargas et
al., 2007).
Other studies, however, question the model’s association to improved ED and
IP use and cost outcomes. A meta-analysis by Grumbach & Bodenheimer (2004) and
Orszag & Ellis (2007) suggested that implementing CCMs resulted in increased

HEALTH RISKS IN MEDICAL HOMES AND THEIR EFFECTS

41

utilization and expenditures. Opponents of the model’s feasibility argue that
improvements in processes and outcomes of care are not statistically significant in
controlled evaluations. For example, a randomized controlled trial of a CCM in
pediatric asthma care suggested that there were no significant differences between
groups regarding the outcomes of asthma care (Homer et al., 2005). A diabetes study
also found short- to intermediate-term improvements in process outcomes after two
years but no improvements in costs (Chin et al., 2007). Hroscikoski et al. (2006) and
Solberg et al. (2006) also found CCM implementation challenges.
Summary of evidence. The evidence thus far suggests that while there are
variants of the MH models, the models are more similar than different. The
similarities and differences are evident from Table 2.1, which delineates the
differences between MHs and Health Homes, and from Table 2.2, which compares
NCQA and PCPCH recognition standards. Stange et al.’s (2010) conclusion captures
the model’s application thus far, specifically that all MH models contain four main
elements: comprehensive primary care, new ways for organizing health care delivery,
stronger internal capacities for practices to provide effective care, and different
incentives for health care delivery.
A review of the evidence of the core components of the model—primary care
and chronic disease management—also suggests that primary care is associated with
improvements in outcomes of care. The evidence also suggests the value of
comprehensive primary care to the model’s application. The evidence on chronic
disease management, however, is mixed. Fragmentation in delivery, the focus on
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single disease conditions, and the lack of well-aligned payment incentives for chronic
disease management are among the problems identified (Grumbach & Bodenheimer,
2004; Orszag & Ellis, 2007). It can be argued from an economic perspective that
aligning payment incentives to support chronic disease management will be necessary
for engaging chronic care patients and for improving outcomes.
Oregon’s PCPCHs are designed to provide care to all patient populations, and
according to a Health Management Associates (HMA) report on health care
transformation in Oregon, the implementation of PCPCHs statewide can reduce
health expenditures by about $4.5 billion in 10 years (HMA, 2012). Since chronic
care patients are significant drivers of health care expenditures, it can be argued that
their enrollment in PCPCHs can help achieve the projected savings. While the design
and implementation of PCPCHs focuses on all patients, this research proposes that
the model’s capacity to reduce the overuse and misuse of ED and IP and associated
expenditures will be enhanced by engaging more high chronic disease burden patients
in PCPCHs.
Variants of the MH model have so far been implemented broadly for different
population groups, including pediatric and adult populations, in different Integrated
Delivery Systems (IDS), and in various states. Reviewing outcomes from the
different implementations of the model will help determine the relative effectiveness
of the model’s application and whether the model’s implementation is focused on
high chronic disease burden patients and associated to reductions in ED and IP
utilization and expenditures. The next sections of this chapter will review evidence on
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outcomes from the different applications of the model in each of the above-mentioned
settings.
Improved Cost-Sensitive Outcomes from Pediatric Populations
From the first application of the model for Children with Special Health Care
Needs (CSHCN) to the current application for all pediatric patients, the evidence
shows some reductions in ED and IP use for pediatric patients. The improved
outcomes were higher among pediatric patients who had chronic conditions, and
when clinics had higher Medical Homeness (MH) index scores. Higher index scores
suggested that the clinics integrated the core components of the model and met
quality improvement benchmarks. Cooley, McAllister, Sherrieb & Kuhlthau (2009)
tested the hypothesis that the “application of the model in primary care practices is
associated to decreased utilization and increased patient satisfaction” (p. 358). The
intervention group was pediatric patients who had chronic conditions; the results
suggested that clinics with higher MH index scores reduced IP and ED use and
improved patient satisfaction. Diedhiou, Probst, Hardin, Martin & Xirasager (2010)
also found that asthma care in MHs for Children with Special Health Care Needs
(CSHCN) resulted in reduced ED use by 1.2 percent for a population of 14,916
patients.
Klitzner, Rabbitt, & Chang (2010) found evidence to support the specific
components of the model that drove improvements in ED and IP use. Their study on
caring for complex pediatric patients showed that effective care coordination resulted
in a 1.1 percent reduction in ED use but no significant improvement in IP use for the
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same population. McGrath, Laflamme, Schwartz, Stransky & Moeschler (2009) also
found in a national survey on CSHCN that having an MH was the strongest predictor
of whether children had genetic counseling services for autism spectrum disorder,
down syndrome, and other behavioral health conditions. Integrating effective
prevention and health education for chronic care patients in the model also resulted in
improved ED and IP use (McGrath et al., 2009). It can be inferred from the evidence
that the application of the model in pediatric settings improved some outcomes. The
improvements in outcomes were significant when clinics were well organized in
terms of higher MH index scores and focused on care coordination and integration.
Improved Cost-Sensitive Outcomes from Adult Populations
While the evidence for improved outcomes from implementing the model for
adult populations is mixed, the evidence nonetheless corroborates the benefits of the
model’s application for high chronic disease burden patients. Ferrante,
Balasubramanian, Hudson, & Crabtree (2010) found that adult patients who had
chronic conditions and were enrolled in MHs received well-coordinated primary care
services and had less ED and IP use. Hearld & Alexander (2012) found that “a one
standard deviation increases in the level of patient-centeredness of care received was
associated with a 4.6 percent decrease in ED utilization” (p. 568) for adult patients
who had chronic conditions. Savage, Lauby & Burkard (2013) and Ferrante, Cohen &
Crosson (2010) evaluated the use of patient navigators for care coordination;
Alexander, Hearld, Mittler, & Harvey (2012) studied the use of patient-centered
approaches to managing chronic conditions. These studies corroborate the importance
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of care coordination and integration to both the model’s application and reduced ED
and IP expenditures. Flottemesch et al. (2012) and Fontaine, Flottemesch, Asche &
Solberg (2011) also found in 27 certified practices in Minnesota that utilization, total
costs of care, and inpatient costs for type-2 diabetes were significantly lower. Patients
in recognized MH practices were also less likely to use ED or IP care services. In
their study on comprehensive ED use by chronic care patients in MHs, Guy et al.
(2013) found that “the largest reductions in ED visits were concentrated among
chronic care patients with diabetes and hypertension” (p. 24-26).
While implementing the model for adult patients in some cases improved ED
and IP use, the health-risk levels of patients who received care determined the
outcomes. Dorr, Wilcox, Brunker, Burdon, & Donnelly (2008) found that while care
management plus, an HIT decision support, improved care for patients with severe
chronic conditions and reduced mortality in the intervention group, the initiative did
not significantly reduce ED or IP utilization or health care costs for patients who had
severe chronic conditions. Jackson et al. (2013), Weaver et al. (2013), and Freidberg
et al. (2014) all found that while patient-level outcomes of care improved for chronic
care patients enrolled in MHs, the improvements did not translate into reductions in
ED and IP use for patients who had chronic health conditions.
Based on their evidence, Freidberg et al. (2014) argued that “HM
interventions may need further refinement” (p. 815). The varying effects of health
risks on outcomes suggests the need for further evaluation of the applications of the
model. Insights into the distributions of health risks and the differential effects of
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health risks on outcomes, especially in the short term, will arguably contribute to
evidence on the model’s reform potential. Since MHs have been implemented in
different health systems, the next section will review outcomes from the model’s
implementation in Integrated Delivery Systems (IDS). Providers at this system level
were early adopters of the model; therefore, outcomes from IDS will provide another
delivery system level perspective on the relative effectiveness of the model’s
application.
Improved Cost-Sensitive Outcomes from Integrated Delivery Systems (IDS)
The focus of this section will be the Group Health Cooperative (GHC) in
Seattle, Washington; Geisinger Health Systems (GHS) Proven Health Navigator
(PHN) in Pennsylvania; and the Veterans Health Administration’s (VA) Patient
Aligned Care Team (PACT) initiative in the Midwest States. Because these providers
were early adopters of the model, their outcomes are often referenced to support the
model’s viability and reform potential in the short run. GHC and PHN pilots began in
2006 by emphasizing primary care, chronic care management, and payment
incentives for comprehensive chronic disease management. The available evidence
suggests that GHC and PHN improved patient outcomes as well as reduced ED and
inpatient care utilization and overall cost of care after case-mix and baseline-risk
adjustments.
In GHC, quasi-experimental evaluations by Ralston et al. (2009) and Reid et
al. (2009) found that pilot sites reduced in-person primary care utilization while
overall primary care access rose 5 percent through secure phone and email
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communication. Health care utilization fell by 29 percent after 21 months, while
quality of care remained the same. Primary and specialty care costs rose by $1.60 and
$5.80 respectively on per-member-per-month (PMPM) basis, but the cost increases
were offset by lower ED and IP use, which helped achieve an overall cost savings of
$14.18 PMPM across all intervention groups after risk adjustment. The improved
outcomes, however, were statistically non-significant (Reid et al., 2010; Meyer,
2010). PHN expanded access to primary care services and restructured physician
incentives as part of their reforms. The available evidence suggests that PHN
achieved 28 percent and 8.1 percent reductions in IP admissions and ED use,
respectively (Gilfillan et al., 2010; Steele et al., 2010). A follow-up evaluation
suggested that cumulative costs after adjusting for prescription drug use fell by 7.1
and 4.3 percent, respectively, between 2006 and 2010 (Maeng et al., 2012). Most of
the improvements in patient and cost outcomes from PHN were attained from
improving care for patients in the Medicare Advantage Plan program.
VAs PACT covered Minnesota, North and South Dakota, Iowa, and Nebraska.
This initiative emphasized primary care and chronic disease management and used
HIT especially for chronic care coordination (Rice et al., 2010). The available
evidence suggests that this initiative improved utilization, cost, and patient level
outcomes. Since 2008 PACT has improved the management of congestive heart
failure (CHF), chronic obstructive pulmonary disease (COPD), and diabetes, and it
achieved 8 and 4 percent reductions in urgent care visits and acute care admissions,
respectively (Rice et al., 2010). Total IP and ED use among all chronic disease
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patients fell by 27 percent, while the cost of care per chronic care patient fell by $593
(Grumbach & Grundy, 2010; Nielsen, Langer, Zema, Hacker, & Grundy, 2012). The
evidence from IDS corroborates the model’s capacity to improve patient outcomes as
well as ED and IP utilizations. The statistically non-significant results in the abovementioned studies, however, suggest the need for further studies on the relative
effectiveness of the model’s application, especially on the level of health risks in
MHs and how that translates into utilization and other outcomes.
Improved Cost-Sensitive Outcomes from State Programs
Reviewing the available evidence from state-level programs will provide
another layer and level of evidence to underscore the implementation of the model
and its relative effectiveness. According to the National Academy of State Health
Policy, MHs or comprehensive primary care initiatives are operational in most states
around the country (Kaye, Buxbaum, & Takach, 2011); while the evidence suggests
improved ED and IP utilization, the evidence is mixed and varies across different
states. Evidence from the following state programs will be reviewed: North Carolina,
Vermont, Colorado, Minnesota, Oklahoma, Massachusetts, and Pennsylvania. These
states were selected based on their early adoption of the Medical Home Model, use of
state-developed or NCQA recognition standards, expansive use of the model by most
providers across the state, use of multi payer provider payment incentives, and the
availability of peer-reviewed research evidence.
North Carolina. Community Care of North Carolina (CCNC) focused on
chronic care patients in Medicaid, expanded primary care services, and coordinated
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and integrated chronic disease management services for patients. The available
evidence shows that this approach to care resulted in a cost savings of $974.5 million
from 2003-2008, $382 million in 2010, and a PMPM savings of $25.40 in 2010
(Grumbach & Grundy, 2010). The largest savings accrued from reduced ED and IP
utilization: ED use fell by 8 percent and 25 percent for pediatric patients with asthma
and for all patients, respectively (Trapp, 2010); IP care for pediatric asthma also fell
by 34 percent, while overall inpatient care fell by about 40 percent (Steiner et al.,
2008; Nielsen, Langner, Zema, Hacker, & Grundy, 2012). CCNC’s strategy to screen
and only enroll patients with elevated risks for multiple chronic physical and
behavioral health conditions accounted for most of the improvements in ED and IP
use and cost savings (Steiner et al., 2008; Trapp, 2010). The evidence from CCNC
corroborates the argument that MHs can improve care and outcomes for chronic care
patients.
Vermont. Since 2006, Vermont’s Blueprint for Health (BPH) has reduced IP
use per 1,000 admissions by 23.9, 15.3 and 39.7 percent at the three demonstration
sites, respectively. ED utilization per 1,000 patient visits has also decreased by 33.8,
18.9, and 2.8 percent at the three demonstration sites, respectively (Nielsen, Langner,
Zema, Hacker, & Grundy, 2012; Hester, 2010). Among BPH’s core delivery
strategies were engaging chronic care patients through continuous access to
multidisciplinary teams as well as well-coordinated referrals. A focus group of
chronic care patients revealed that their continuous access to providers resulted in
their reduced ED use (Bielaszka-DuVernay, 2011; Hsiao, Knight, Kappel, & Done,

HEALTH RISKS IN MEDICAL HOMES AND THEIR EFFECTS

50

2011). While the evidence suggests that BPH focused on chronic care patients, the
health-risk levels of patients in each panel of 20,000 was not reported in the study.
Colorado. In Colorado, a pre-post evaluation of the implementation of MHs
showed the following improved outcomes: 18 percent reduction in acute IP utilization
per 1,000 patient visits compared to the control group, and 15 percent reduction in ED
utilization per 1000 patient visits (Raskas et al., 2012; Harbrecht & Lisa, 2012). Cost
of care in the intervention group decreased by $215 per patient per year compared to
the control group, while access to primary care services improved from 54 to 73
percent (Takach, 2011).
Minnesota. Minnesota’s Health Care Home program, started in 2010, had the
following improved outcomes: 39, 24, and 40 percent reductions in ED visits, IP
admissions, and re-hospitalizations, respectively. Outpatient costs for patients using
more than 11 medications, i.e. high health risk patients, were reduced by $1,282 per
patient (Flottemesch, Fontaine, Asche, & Solberg, 2011). Average overall costs
decreased by 8 percent (Nielsen, Langner, Zema, Hacker, & Grundy, 2012).
Oklahoma. The available evidence suggests that Oklahoma’s PCMH program
reduced per capita cost per patient per year for Medicaid by $29 from 2008 to 2010.
Access to evidence-based primary care services, including screening for breast and
cervical cancer also increased during the same evaluation period. Other access
measures, including patient inquiries about same-day or next-day appointments,
decreased from 1,670 inquiries to 13 within a year from 2009 to 2010. PCMH
enrollees responses to a survey in 2010 also suggested improvements in service
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delivery. Patients who responded that they always got treatment quickly, increased by
8 percent between 2008 and 2010 (Takach, 2011).
Massachusetts. The available evidence on the state’s Patient-Centered
Medical Home Initiative (PCMHI) suggest that there have been statistically
significant improvements in various quality measures. Behl-Chadha, et al., (2017)
suggested that PCMHI implementation in community health clinics resulted in
improvements in 11 of 22 clinical quality measures, including chronic disease
management, prevention and care coordination. A qualitative evaluation of the
performance of clinics also showed consistent improvements on specific patient care
metrics. The mean adjusted score for clinics on Self- management support (i.e.,
Providers support you in taking care of your own health) was 74 compared to 64 for
comparator practices (p<.001). Clinics also scored higher, compared to comparator
practices, on Behavioral health integration measures (i.e., Providers pay attention to
your mental or emotional health) (Cabral, Sefton, & Anderson, 2013).
Pennsylvania. Evaluations of the PCCI initiative show that inpatient
admissions decreased by 0.3, 0.2, and 0.2 in 2009, 2010, and 2011, respectively,
while specialist visits were reduced by 12.3 and 10 per 1000 patients in 2010 and
2011, respectively. However, ED utilization and outpatient visits increased
significantly (Neal, Chawla, Colombo, Snyder, & Nigam, 2015). Friedberg,
Schneider, Rosenthal, Volpp, & Werner (2014) also suggested in their study that
demonstration practices in PCCI improved quality of care after three years, but
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utilization and cost of IP, ED, and ambulatory care in demonstration practices did not
decrease in the same period.
Summary of evidence. It can be broadly inferred from the above evidence on
the application of the model for adult and pediatric patients, in IDS and from various
state levels programs, that most MH programs, while using different verbiage to
describe the model, emphasized the core elements of the model, namely
comprehensive primary care, new ways for organizing health care delivery, stronger
internal capacities for practices to provide effective care, and different incentives for
health care delivery. The models had different patient focuses (adult, pediatric, or
both) and were designed to provide care to different health risk patients, achieving
varying levels of changes in ED and IP utilizations and expenditures. While the
evidence suggests that chronic care patients can benefit from receiving care in
Medical Homes, the reductions in ED and IP use and expenditures were mixed. For
example, the evidence suggested that improvements in ED and IP use and costs were
moderated when the programs focused on patients who were considered risky due to
complex health conditions.
Starfield (2011) posited that “contrary to conventional wisdom, the main
determinant of high costs of care is not the presence of chronic illness, but rather the
combination of various types of illnesses or multi-morbidity” (p. 64). The
comparatively higher utilization along with cost pressures from patients who have
comorbid health conditions makes further insights into health risks necessary to
understand the relative effectiveness of the application of the model. The focus of this

HEALTH RISKS IN MEDICAL HOMES AND THEIR EFFECTS

53

research on evaluating chronic conditions-based health risks and their differential
effects on ED and IP utilization is designed to provide another level of evidence for
the relative effectiveness of the application of the model and the model’s potential
contribution to health care delivery reforms.
The Importance of Health Risks to this Research
It has been argued that how we pay for services directly determines the quality
and quantity of services produced. This observation is important and applicable to
health care delivery, especially to the growing use of risk-adjusted payments and
physician profiling based on their patients. Evaluating PCPCHs based on their levels
of health risks will help determine the relative effectiveness of the model’s
application to improve both health care expenditures and provider payment policies.
The next section will introduce the concept of health risks and their importance to this
research, evaluate the association between health risks and outcomes, and describe
how this association helps frame this research perspective. This section will also
discuss the use of the chronic disease burden measure in PCPCHs as a proxy measure
for health risks in this research.
The role of risk selection and the effects of selecting healthy patients and
dropping relatively sicker patients is empirically evident in health services literature
(Newhouse, Buntin, & Chapman, 1997; Thomas, Grazier, & Ward, 2004;
Maciejewski, Liu, Derleth, McDonell, & Anderson, 2005). Provisions in the
Affordable Care Act that stipulate equal access to care for patients who have
preexisting conditions, combined with the current practice of health insurance payers
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profiling physicians and other health care workers based on the health risk levels of
their patient panels for payment and other purposes, have created an environment in
which tracking, prioritizing, and managing health risks have become important.
Newhouse (1996a) observed that “regardless of how good risk adjusters become, we
will never have a perfect formula, only better approximations of it” (p. 31).
Many independent studies have also questioned the efficiency and
effectiveness of the numerous risk assessment and adjustment technologies in use
(American Medical Association [AMA], 2009; Newhouse, 1996; Johnson, 2013;
Horner, 2012). Despite these developments, many payers rely on current risk
assessment and adjustment technologies for payment, provider profiling, and patient
management. It can be argued that the questions surrounding risk assessment and
adjustment methodologies make risk selection a viable option for some providers to
achieve higher profiling scores, improve reimbursement, and subsequent profitability.
The focus of this research on evaluating the levels of health risks in PCPCHs
is important because the evidence thus far is inconclusive. While some studies on
MHs suggest that reductions in ED and IP use and health care expenditures are higher
when MH interventions focus on chronic care patients considered high risk (Guy,
Gunnarsson, Saynisch, Chawla, & Nigam, 2013; Friedberg, Schneider, Rosenthal,
Volpp, & Werner, 2014; Warner, Duggan, Duey, Zhu, & Stuart, 2013), other studies
suggest mixed outcomes (Friedberg et al., 2014; Jackson & Williams, 2015). In
addition, while all states have implemented MHs, state programs are designed to
focus on different patient populations. For example, North Carolina, Minnesota, and
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Colorado focus on chronic care patients, while Oregon’s PCPCH is designed for all
patients. Since the development of payment reforms to incentivize MH care has not
kept pace with the model, and the fact that most of these payment systems are based
on existing risk adjustment technologies that have problems identified above,
evaluating the level of health risks in PCPCHs will provide information about the
application of the model in the state and the relative effectiveness of the model’s
capacity to engage chronic care patients and improve ED and IP expenditures for
such patients. The results of this evaluation can help improve payment incentives for
recognized PCPCH providers.
Association between Health Risks and Outcomes in Medical Homes
The association between health risks and expenditure outcomes is implied
because chronic care patients exert significant pressures on health care delivery
through utilization (misuse, overuse, and underuse), which in turn contributes to
higher health care costs. The association between health risks and outcomes is also
empirically verifiable from the evidence on risk selection explained above
(Newhouse, 1996; Johnson, 2013; Horner, 2012), and from MH implementation
studies on ED, IP utilization, and health care expenditures for high chronic disease
burden patients (Guy, Gunnarsson, Saynisch, Chawla, & Nigam, 2013; Friedberg,
Schneider, Rosenthal, Volpp, & Werner, 2014; Werner, Duggan, Duey, Zhu, &
Stuart, 2013; Friedberg et al., 2014; Jackson & Williams, 2015).
The associations between health risks and outcomes are evident in non-MH
health care settings as well. Goetzel et al. (1998) and Ronaldo et al. (2013) evaluated
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health risk profiles among employees of large companies and found evidence
suggesting that companies with lower health risk employees had lower health care
expenditures. Evidence from the Diabetes Prevention program suggests that engaging
patients who have higher risks for diabetes produces comparatively higher cost
savings (Eddy, Schlessinger, & Kahn, 2005; Russell, 2009; Goetzel, 2009).
The landscape of health care delivery underscores the association between
health risks and outcomes. The evidence suggests that health care utilization and costs
are disproportionately higher among patients who have various levels of chronic
physical and behavioral health conditions. Figure 2.1 below illustrates the total health
care expenditures in the United States in 2012, suggesting that fewer people used
larger proportions of health care expenditures: 1 percent of the population is
responsible for 22.7 percent of health care expenditures; 5 percent account for 50
percent; 10 percent for 66 percent; 25 percent for 86.7 percent; 50 percent of the
population also account for 97.3 percent of health care expenditures; the remaining 50
percent of the population however, is responsible for only 2.3 percent of health
expenditures. This distribution of health care expenditures in the United States has
not changed significantly since 2012.
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Figure 2.1
Total Health Expenditures for 2012 = 1.35 Trillion

Source: Center for Financing, Access, and Cost Trends, AHRQ Household Component of the Medical
Expenditure Panel Survey 2012

Based on the association between health risks, health outcomes and
expenditures, and the expected benefits of MHs for all patients, especially chronic
care patients, it can be argued that engaging a significant proportion of the patients
who have high health expenditures in MHs, for example, the 50 percent of patients
who use 97.3 percent of health expenditures could provide potential opportunities for
improving health care delivery through providing comprehensive primary care
services upstream while reducing downstream utilization of ED and IP and
expenditures. Evaluating the level of health risks in MHs will provide important
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insights into the relative effectiveness of the model’s application in the short term and
help predict the model’s viability and sustainability over the long term.
The evidence suggests that the trajectory of health care cost growth slowed
after federal reforms, including MH reforms in 2010, but there is no consensus on the
causes of the slowdown. While some studies postulated that the implementation of
the Affordable Care Act may have contributed to the slowdown (Altman, 2015),
others suggested a mix of factors that included economic slowdown (Getzen, 2014).
Regardless, it can be argued that the sustainability of MH reforms in the long term
will depend on the model’s capacity to effectively manage chronic conditions and
help reduce downstream pressure on ED and IP utilization and expenditures in the
short term. In a resource-constrained environment, short-term improvements will be
important for long-term support of the model. While short-term improvements in
outcomes may not necessarily translate into long-term cost savings, short-term
improvements will at least suggest the potential viability and sustainability of the
model over the long term. The focus of this research on the application of PCPCHs
will evaluate the short-term effects of health risks on improvements in ED and IP
outcomes.
Health Risks and Risk Assessment
Health Services Research on health risks and risk assessments have
traditionally analyzed demographic, administrative, and self-reported health status
data to predict expenditures and patient outcomes. Demographic data broadly
includes age, gender, family status, and residential location of patients (via zip codes).
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Administrative or claims data sources include prior expenditure and diagnosis codes
or related groups and prescription use, while self-reported data use has focused on
self-reported health status surveys. The validity of some of these data sources,
however, has been questioned. For example, self-reported data is considered
subjective, while the use of previous health care expenditure data tends to inflate the
cost of services because future utilization and costs are based on previous utilization
(Martin, Rogal, & Arnold, 2004).
Health risks will be the primary independent variable of interest to this
research. The relative effectiveness of PCPCHs will be assessed based on the levels
of chronic conditions in PCPCHs. Conceptually, risk assessment uses claims data on
patients’ medical conditions and socio-demographic variables for predicting
utilization and health care costs (Martin, Rogal, & Arnold, 2004; Winkelman &
Mehmud, 2007). This research will create and use a chronic disease burden measure
as a proxy health risk measure. Similar approaches to measuring health risks have
been used in health services research (Hornbook & Goodman,1996; Ash et al., 2000).
The following 10 markers of chronic physical and behavioral conditions will be
aggregated at the individual level to create a chronic disease burden measure:
cardiovascular disease, chronic heart failure, coronary heart disease, chronic kidney
disease, asthma/COPD, diabetes, obesity, affective disorder, other behavioral health,
and schizophrenia. A weighted average chronic disease burden measure will then be
calculated based on the average number of individuals and their proportional
attribution for each PCPCH and comparator observation.
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Theoretical Perspectives
Health care delivery in the country is considered a ‘market-based delivery
system.’ Among the assumptions of a market-based system are the availability of
perfect information for all economic agents to make informed decisions and the
efficient allocation of health care resources based on demand and supply, which
results in efficient allocation of resources and effective outcomes. The current health
care delivery system, however, lags most advanced countries on the main benchmarks
of efficiency and effectiveness (Commonwealth Fund, 2015). Fragmentation in how
health care delivery is organized has contributed to a complex delivery system
environment that exerts pressure on health care costs, quality (overuse, underuse,
misuse, and high error rates), resulting in a growing disease burden and declining
patient outcomes.
Various reform initiatives including MHs were therefore implemented to help
improve the organization, delivery, and outcomes of health care. However, it can be
argued from a systems perspective that the relative effectiveness of ongoing reforms,
including MHs, may depend on changes to existing incentive systems in the delivery
system environment to foster cooperation among the various agents (payers,
providers, and patients), which in turn will lead to improved care coordination,
integration, and outcomes. For example, while all agents in a market-based system
are assumed to have ‘perfect information’ to enable self-interest-based decision
making, this is not the case in the current health care delivery environment.
Asymmetric information in the environment suggests that some patients may not be
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receiving care in PCPCHs because they do not have information or incentives to selfenroll in PCPCHs. The theoretical perspectives of this research, Risk Selection in
health care services delivery and Complex Adaptive Systems (CAS), provide insights
into some environmental factors that could affect the engagement of patients whose
health risks drive health care utilization and expenditures in PCPCHs.
Risk selection. The economic theory of Risk Selection posits that health risks
are heterogeneous, unevenly distributed in populations, and un-priced (Newhouse,
1996a). The un-priced risk heterogeneity makes providing care for relatively healthy
patients more financially rewarding than patients with various chronic physical and
behavioral health conditions. Rational economic agents such as providers and payers
tend to select ‘good’ risks based on the health conditions of patients and their
potential health care utilization and cost of care. Risk Selection persists because the
nature of health risks creates transaction costs in separating and pricing health risk
types. Most payers, therefore, use the average expected cost approach to
reimbursement (Newhouse,1996b).
This approach suggests that providers who treat patient panels with higher
than average health risks may operate at a financial disadvantage because they will be
reimbursed based on the average expected cost, which may be less than the cost of
treating such patients. The average cost approach to reimbursement, furthermore, has
implications for the use of comprehensive payments for MH care, especially how
reimbursements for provider teams of chronic care patients are structured to
incentivize provider teams to effectively coordinate and integrate care for these
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patients. The nature of health risks and the evidence on Risk Selection in health care
service delivery has been well documented (Newhouse, Buntin, & Chapman, 1997;
Ettner, Frank, McGuire, & Hermann, 2001; Kansagara et al., 2011).
The lack of access to health care information for some agents, especially
patients and some providers, make Risk Selection likely in the current delivery
system environment. The second theorem of optimality posits that information
asymmetry contributes to market imperfections and makes risk selection and ‘cream
skimming’ possible (Arrow, 1963; Newhouse, 1996; Reinhardt, 1998). In a market
approach to delivering health care, information asymmetry creates imbalances in the
agency relationships among patients, providers, and payers (private, public, and
individuals) and potentially contributes to uncertainty, Risk Selection, and ineffective
health care delivery (Newhouse, 1996a; Williamson, 2005). For example, while MHs
are designed to benefit chronic care patients, most of these patients do not have
sufficient information to determine their health conditions and the benefits of
enrolling in MHs. The lack of transparency in the pricing of medical care and the
alignment of incentives in health care production can also affect patients’ capacity to
determine the true cost and benefits from enrolling in MHs. This information gap
increases the likelihood that the interests of patients, providers, and payers may not be
aligned in health care production, therefore increasing the likelihood of patient
selection and the avoidance of high risk patients.
Risk Selection is further possible because the health care production
environment allows heterogeneous firms (providers and payers) with different
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production costs to use strategies such as offering different products, employing
different staff, and locating in different communities to attract relatively low risk
patients (Ma, 1994; Ellis & McGuire, 1986). Even though PCPCHs and all health
care providers are ethically compelled to do no harm (i.e. non-malfeasance) while
providing health care services, it can be argued that, all things being equal, the
economic environment and incentive structures will influence providers’ agency
relationships regarding the types of patient risks to attract.
PCPCH clinics that enroll higher-than-average health risk patients while
collecting average-cost reimbursements may not be economically viable or
sustainable in the short- and long-term. As a result, the potential capacity of PCPCHs
to reduce the overuse and misuse of ED and IP and their associated expenditures may
be minimized. Risk Selection can be positive or adverse. Positive selection occurs
when providers can attract relatively healthy patients whose health risks are lower
than the average Medicaid or community risk. Adverse Risk Selection, on the other
hand, occurs when providers can attract relatively sicker patients who have higher
health risks than the average Medicaid or community risk (CMS, 2003). Since
containing rising health care costs is a goal of the Triple Aim, evaluating the levels of
health risks in PCPCHs will help determine whether PCPCHs are enrolling the types
of patients whose risks drive utilization and expenditures.
Complex Adaptive Systems (CAS). Plesk (2001) defined CAS as a
“collection of individual agents who have the freedom to act in ways that are not
always predictable and whose actions are interconnected such that one agent’s actions
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change the context for other agents” (pp. 312-313). CAS systems are comprised of
the following elements: open systems with feedback loops, operating far from
equilibrium, actions that are embedded in the context of their histories, continuous
interaction with their environments, and interactions that often result in nonlinear
effects (Holden, 2005). Crabtree et al. (2011), Holden (2005), Crabtree, McDaniel,
Miller, & Stange (1998), and Plesk (2001) all consider health care delivery broadly,
and primary care practices as CAS, because the elements in their environments
influence health care production and outcomes. Considering PCPCHs as CAS
provides another theoretical lens for analyzing the relative effectiveness of the
application of the model, specifically how the complex health care delivery system
environment influences health risk levels in PCPCHs and reductions in ED and IP
expenditures.
Among the PCPCH agents whose actions and interests are interconnected
during health care production include patients, providers, and payers. Conceptually,
health care production in PCPCHs emphasizes patient-centered relationships that are
formed around multidisciplinary care teams. Optimum health care production
depends on engaging all patients, including patients who have chronic conditions;
however, asymmetric information in the health care production environment, along
with the profiling of providers and paying for health care services, create barriers for
providing care to chronic care patients in all settings, including PCPCHs, and to
incentivizing selection.
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A complex and adaptive delivery environment that is characterized by
information asymmetry could affect the capacity of chronic care patients to evaluate
multiple components of their health care: the benefits of enrolling in PCPCHs, the
likelihood that the composition of PCPCH patient panels will reflect the health risks
levels in their communities, and PCPCHs’ capacity to reduce the inappropriate use of
ED and IP and expenditures. One example of the potential effects of information
asymmetry is the structural and delivery system problems a Massachusetts woman
encountered in her quest to compare provider prices to inform her choice of provider
for vaginal delivery (Bebinger, 2014). This example is arguably repeated in many
patient encounters across various levels of the delivery system, and it reflects
structural problems in the market-based approach to health care production that can
have consequences for patients’ agency relationships, and potentially the outcomes of
care in PCPCHs.
Health care delivery has gone through several stages of reforms and
transformations. Crabtree et al. (2011) observed from historical evidence on primary
care transformation that improving outcomes of care may only be achieved from
“major changes to the interdependent relationships among agents” (p. S30). By
design, MH reforms focus on one level of the delivery system; the capacity of the
model to create broad systems changes and improve outcomes may be limited in the
current delivery system environment and relationship among agents. While the
PCPCH model can in theory help reduce the overuse and misuse of ED, IP, and
expenditures, the relative effectiveness of the model will depend on coordinating and
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integrating care for patients, especially those with various levels of physical and
behavioral health conditions. Theories on CAS and Risk Selection, however, suggest
there could be environmental factors that can affect the application of the model and
the expected outcomes.
Summary of theoretical perspectives. It can be inferred from the theories of
Risk Selection and CAS that health care incentives may not be aligned to engage
chronic care patients or change the paths of patient populations who have higher ED
and IP utilization. The evidence from PCPCH implementation thus far suggests that
clinics are operational in different communities and by different payer groups.
Because different patient populations and communities have different health risk
levels, PCPCHs patient panels likely contain different health risks.
In a delivery system environment characterized by asymmetric information,
CAS suggests that PCPCHs’ health care production may not attain equilibrium if
health risk levels in their patient panels are lower than the health risk levels in the
communities they operate. Reductions in ED and IP use and expenditures may also
not be optimum. This current health care delivery environment, therefore, makes
opportunism a potential threat to the relative effectiveness of the application of the
PCPCH model. Williamson (1979) defined opportunism as “a variety of self-interest
seeking behavior that includes self-interest seeking with guile” (p. 234). According to
Williamson (1979), opportunism will arise in a market environment characterized by
high transaction costs and asymmetric information. To reduce the effects of
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opportunism, Williamson proposed the use of markets and hierarchies as governance
mechanisms to safeguard the “integrity of transactions” (p. 22).
While the use of various comprehensive payment incentives for PCPCH care
is designed to incentivize clinics and providers to engage high-risk patients who will
need and benefit from PCPCH care, the effectiveness of these payments will depend
on how each provider team member engages high health-risk patients, and how that
translates into the allocation of proportional payments for provider team members.
The evidence on Risk Selection and wasted capacity in health care services delivery
suggests challenges to the payment reforms for incentivizing patient engagement.
Evaluating the health risk levels in PCPCHs will help determine whether PCPCHs are
engaging the types of patients who have various levels of chronic physical and
behavioral health conditions.
The theories of this research do not conclusively prescribe specific health-risk
distributions in PCPCHs or reductions in the overuse and misuse of ED and IP
utilization and expenditures that will be achieved by PCPCHs. However, the theories
suggest that if reducing or containing health care costs is a goal of ongoing PCPCH
reforms, then evaluating how people with different health conditions are distributed
throughout PCPCHs will provide information about the contributions of the model’s
application to reduce ED and IP expenditures.
Grand Summary of the Evidence
Medical Home variants are being implemented around the country as part of
broader delivery system reforms. In Oregon, PCPCHs are an important element of
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health care transformation in the state to achieve the Triple Aim. Proponents of
Medical Home reforms argued that the model’s emphases on comprehensive primary
care, care coordination and integration for chronic disease management, and the use
of provider teams across the care continuum will accomplish the following: improve
care for all patients, especially those with chronic physical and behavioral conditions;
reduce the overuse, misuse, and underuse of ED and IP; and contain rising health care
costs. However, it can be inferred that the model’s capacity to improve the above
outcomes will depend on enrolling patients who have comparatively higher health
care utilization because of their chronic physical and behavioral health conditions.
A review of the evidence on the model’s implementations thus far suggests
mixed evidence for the capacity to reduce ED and IP use, expenditures, and health
care costs. The evidence suggests that health risks are important and have varying
effects on outcomes. The model is designed to provide upstream services to engage
chronic care patients in ambulatory settings and change the paths of such patients
from utilizing expensive ED and IP care; however, Risk Selection and the
misalignment of incentives in health care delivery suggest that providers may be
inclined to select healthy patients. In addition, patients who have higher risks may not
enroll into MHs because of asymmetric information in the complex health care
delivery system environment. This research proposes that the integration of primary
care and CCM, and the coordination and integration of care for patients in PCPCHs,
are necessary but insufficient for reducing ED and IP use and expenditures. In the
short term, the composition of patients who have chronic physical and behavior
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health conditions in PCPCH panels will be important for reducing the overuse and
misuse of ED and IP utilization and expenditures. The implementation of PCPCHs
for Medicaid patients and all the state’s population provides opportunities for
evaluating the health risk levels of PCPCHs and their associations with reductions in
ED and IP expenditures in the short term. Based on the history of the model, evidence
on the application of the model thus far, and the specific theories of this research, the
following research questions and hypotheses emerged.
Research Questions and Hypotheses
This dissertation will explore the following three questions:
1. What is the average chronic disease burden of PCPCHs, and how does
their average chronic disease burden compare to the communities
PCPCHs are in pre-post PCPCH recognition?
It is hypothesized that primary care clinics that become PCPCHs will initially have
chronic disease burdens equal to their community comparators, but the chronic
disease burden in PCPCHs will be higher than their communities after recognition,
based on the expectation that PCPCHs will enroll more chronic care patients.
2. How do primary care expenditures change based on the chronic disease
burden of PCPCHs?
It is hypothesized that primary care expenditures will be higher after PCPCH
recognition, for high chronic disease burden PCPCHs, based on the expectation that
PCPCHs will provide more primary care services to high chronic disease burden
patients who will need and use more primary care services.
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3. Do PCPCHs that engage more high chronic disease burden patients have
more reductions in ED and IP expenditures?
It is hypothesized that PCPCHs will achieve higher reductions in ED and IP
expenditures after PCPCH recognition, based on the expectation that patients who
have high chronic disease burden will have greater response to PCPCH services, such
as comprehensive primary care, including care coordination, integration, and
continuity, which will translate into reductions in the inappropriate (overuse and
misuse) of ED and IP services.
Answers to these questions will contribute to the knowledge base and
evidence for the model’s application and relative effectiveness. This research will
primarily be exploratory because the introduction of the model and evidence for the
model’s application are emerging fields of study. The literature on health risks and
Risk Selection suggests that both concepts are complex in their application to health
care services research (Newhouse, Buntin, & Chapman, 1997). Plesk’s (2001)
argument that changes in health care tend to lie in “zones of complexity” and often
results in nonlinear outcomes applies to this research.
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Chapter 3: Research Methods
This chapter describes the quantitative research methods for testing the
proposed hypotheses and answering the research questions posed in Chapter 2. A
natural experimental research design is used to estimate the policy effects of the
application of the Patient-Centered Primary Care Home (PCPCH) model, specifically,
changes in the chronic disease burden levels in PCPCHs and their association to PC,
ED, and IP utilization. This chapter is organized according to the following main
headings: Research Design, Sources of Data, Study Population, Data Attribution
Methods, Aggregate PCPCH and Comparator Measures, Dependent Variables,
Independent/Case-Matching Variables, Empirical Methods, Evidence Base for
Empirical Methods, Difference-in-Difference Models, Statistical Analysis, and
Limitations of Research Methods.
Research Design
This research is designed as a natural experiment. Opportunities for natural
experimental studies arise when policy or program changes create disparate impacts
on different population groups. The policy or program effects can be evaluated on the
‘naturally’ formed groups such as those who are affected by the changes (i.e.
treatment groups) and those who are unaffected (control groups). Exogenous
variation in natural experiments is measured based on changes to the treatment and
control groups (Meyer, 1995). Oregon’s PCPCH program was introduced in October
2011 as part of a state-wide delivery system transformation (HB 2009) to promote the
Triple Aim, which includes reducing or containing health care costs. Based on the
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evidence of association between health risks and health care costs, this research
evaluated the levels of health risks in PCPCHs to determine the model’s capacity to
achieve the aim of reducing health care costs through improved PC, ED, and IP
utilization. This natural experimental study compared the recognition of some
primary care clinics and providers as PCPCHs to non-PCPCH primary care clinics.
Health risks are important to this research. A chronic disease burden measure
was developed and used as a proxy health risk measure for this research. The chronic
disease burden measure was based on the following 10 markers of chronic conditions:
cardiovascular disease, chronic heart failure, coronary heart disease, chronic kidney
disease, asthma/COPD, diabetes, obesity, affective disorder, other behavioral health,
and schizophrenia. The policy effects of the introduction of PCPCHs were measured
by comparing the average chronic disease burden in PCPCHs (intervention group)
and non-PCPCHs (control group) to determine the differences in chronic disease
burden and the average expenditures for PC, ED, and IP by chronic disease burden
levels pre-post PCPCH recognition. Data on primary care patients in 2011 was used
for constructing the pre-policy period while the post-policy period comprised data on
the first wave of PCPCH recognition from 2012 to September 2014. This research
design was implemented through difference-in-difference methods, which will be
explained later in this chapter.
Sources of Data
Data from Oregon’s All Payer All Claims (APAC) data system, which
includes claims and eligibility files, and data from the PCPCH attestation process for
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recognizing primary care clinics as PCPCHs were utilized for this research. Oregon’s
APAC data system provided standardized data on health care utilization, which
included pharmacy claims, patients’ de-identified demographic information, and
payer information from private, public and third-party health plans and payers (Love,
Custer, & Miller, 2010).
Study Population
The study population comprised patients receiving primary care in Oregon.
Primary care was the level of analysis while PCPCH clinics were the unit of analysis.
To effectively evaluate the policy effects of the application of PCPCHs, this study
utilized quarterly data on primary care patients from October 2011 through
September 2014. The pre-policy implementation period was based on data from
October 2010 to September 2011, while the post-policy implementation period
utilized data from October 2011 to September 2014. Selection was based on patients
who had at least one primary care visit from a designated PCPCH or a community
comparator practice within the study period. Using this date span helped capture
periods before and after the introduction of PCPCHs and minimized the policy
implementation effects by excluding data from three months before and after policy
implementation. Due to the span of data that was available, the research and its
findings will only cover the first wave of PCPCH attestations up to September 2014.
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Data Attribution Methods
As part of attribution in this research, patients and providers were assigned to
PCPCH and community comparators. Patients were attributed to PCPCHs on a
proportional basis. As part of this measure, the number of a patient’s primary care
visits and the total PCPCH visits were calculated and weighted to determine the
proportional PCPCH visits per patient. The proportional attribution of patients to
PCPCHs helps account for the care of patients who received care from multiple
PCPCH providers per period (Higgins, Zeddies, & Pearson, 2011; Lewis, McClurg,
Smith, Fisher, & Bynum, 2013; Harbrecht & Latts, 2012). The attribution of primary
care clinics and providers as PCPCH was based on a cross-walk key comprising the
providers’ ZIP codes from their national provider identifier and from PCPCH
attestation data from the state’s recognition data. Primary care clinics that applied for
and were recognized by the state as PCPCHs during that period were attributed
accordingly as PCPCHs. Primary care clinics that applied for but were not recognized
were dropped from the study. These attribution methods helped identify PCPCH and
non-PCPCH patients, create PCPCH aggregate measures, and construct the
community comparators through a case-matching approach like propensity score
matching.
Development of the chronic disease burden measure. Based on the design
of this research to evaluate the general distribution of health risks in PCPCHs and
their relationship to selected outcome measures, a simple chronic disease burden
measure was developed and used as a proxy health risk measure for this research.
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Previous health services research (Ash & Ellis, 2012; Hornbook & Goodman, 1996;
Ash et al., 2000) have used similar approaches - using markers of chronic conditions to evaluate the performance of primary care clinics and to adjust primary care
provider payments. To develop the chronic disease burden measure, primary
diagnosis data for each study subject was used to identify the presence of the
following 10 conditions: cardiovascular disease, chronic heart failure, coronary heart
disease, chronic kidney disease, asthma/COPD, diabetes, obesity, affective disorder,
other behavioral health, and schizophrenia. A binary condition marker was created
with value of 1 if a patient had at least one claim with a primary diagnosis consistent
with the 10 conditions. The following ICD-9 diagnoses codes were used to identify
each condition: Chronic Health Failure: 428.00-428.99; Chronic Heart Disease:
420.00-420.99, 410.00-414.99,429.20-429.09; Chronic Kidney Disease: 585.00585.99; Cerebrovascular Disease: 438.00-438.99; Chronic Obstructive
Pulmonary Disease(COPD): 490.00-490; Diabetes: 250.00-250.99; Obesity:
278.00-278.09; Schizophrenia: 295.00-295.99; Affective Disorders: 296.00-296.99;
and, Other Behavioral Health Conditions: 297.00-312.99.
The 10 markers of chronic conditions were summed at the individual patient
level to develop an individual chronic disease burden score. The markers for the three
behavioral health conditions (schizophrenia, affective disorder, other behavioral
health) are independent; therefore, the maximum aggregate score for the 10
conditions was 8. An aggregate average chronic disease burden measure was then
calculated for each PCPCH and community comparator observation in each of the 16
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quarters of study data (Q4 2010 to Q3 2014) based on the number of quarterly
individuals weighted by their proportional attribution to each PCPCH or comparator.
These measures of average chronic disease burden were used to assess trends
in PCPCHs over time and, in comparison to their community comparators. Among
PCPCH observations, the quarterly chronic disease burden measures were further
aggregated and averaged to construct an average profile across all study years. This
calculation was used to stratify PCPCHs into high and low chronic disease burden
groups based on the median of the PCPCH chronic disease burden measures.
This stratification was used for this research and analysis in two ways: to
compare outcomes for high and low chronic disease burden PCPCHs, and to compare
outcomes for high and low chronic disease burden PCPCHs to their respective
community comparators. Specifically, the average changes in the dependent variables
for research questions 2 and 3 were measured from three different perspectives:
comparing high and low chronic disease burden PCPCHs, comparing low chronic
disease burden PCPCHs to their respective chronic disease burden community
comparators, and comparing high chronic disease burden PCPCHs to their respective
chronic disease burden community comparators. The different levels of comparison
helped assess whether the comparison of high-versus-low chronic disease burden
PCPCHs did not simply reflect differences in the PCPCHs’ communities.
Aggregate PCPCH and Comparator Measures
The aggregate measures in this research were based on case-matching the
independent variables (the selection of which is explained below): age, gender, health
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insurance payer type, and ZIP code of patients. As part of the matching process,
observations from each independent variable were aggregated and weighted to create
PCPCH aggregate measures. The weighted PCPCH measures were then used to
identify and construct community comparators. To ensure that primary care patients
in the community comparator groups reflected the types of patients the PCPCH
served, the independent variables were used in a case-matching process to identify
community comparators (non PCPCH clinics).
As part of this process, data on each independent variable was aggregated and
weighted to ensure that the elements, dimensions, and proportions of the PCPCH and
its community comparator were the same. Doing so improved the comparison process
and ensured that PCPCHs were analyzed against comparators that had similar
characteristics and reflected both the types of patients the PCPCHs served and the
communities where the PCPCHs operated. Community comparators comprised
primary care clinics and providers in the state that are not recognized as PCPCHs.
Clinics that applied for PCPCH recognition but were unsuccessful in their application
as well as clinics preparing to apply or currently going through PCPCH recognition
were excluded from the comparator groups to minimize the effects of confounding.
Dependent Variables
The dependent variables of this research were the following: chronic disease
burden of PCPCHs and their comparators, primary care expenditures by PCPCHs and
their comparators, average ED utilization by PCPCHs and their comparators, and
average IP utilization by PCPCHs and their comparators. Individually, each outcome

HEALTH RISKS IN MEDICAL HOMES AND THEIR EFFECTS

78

variable helps evaluate a specific element of the application of the model, and
collectively they provide insights into the application of the model in the state.
Proponents of the PCPCH model argued that its implementation could improve
primary care for patients in ambulatory settings and reduce the reliance on and
utilization of ED and IP for primary care related health needs (Peikes, Dale,
Lundquist, & Genevro, 2011; Gilfillan et al., 2010; Reid et al., 2010; Reid et al.,
2009; Rittenhouse, Thom, & Schmittdiel, 2010; David, Gunnarsson, Saynisch,
Chawla, & Nigam, 2013). Embedded in this argument is the expectation that the
utilization of some primary care services will increase in PCPCHs, which will
translate into reduced ED and IP utilization and expenditures because some of the
health needs that drive patients to use ED and IP will be appropriately addressed
through comprehensive primary care upstream in ambulatory settings. However,
other research suggests weak associations between implementing the model and
improved ED, IP, and health care costs (Friedberg, Schneider, Rosenthal, Volpp, &
Werner, 2014; Werner, Duggan, Duey, Zhu, & Stuart, 2013).
Based on established associations between health risks and outcomes
(Conwell & Cohen, 2012; AHRQ, 2011), this research proposes that the levels of
chronic conditions in PCPCHs based on the chronic disease burden measure could
determine the model’s capacity to improve ED and IP utilization. The association
between health risks and outcomes makes the chronic disease burden levels in
PCPCHs important to the model’s reform potential. The evidence suggests that
chronic care patients usually utilize health care services disproportionately, especially
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ED and IP care. This association has been confirmed by research (Wolff, Starfield, &
Anderson, 2002; Johnson et al., 2012). Ascertaining chronic disease burden in
PCPCHs and their effects on utilization of ED, IP, and PC will help determine the
relative effectiveness of the application of the model and reform potential.
Chronic disease burden of PCPCHs and their comparators. Based on the
expected association between chronic disease and utilization, this research developed
and used the average chronic disease burden measure as a dependent variable for a
step-wise evaluation of the application of PCPCHs to help answer the three research
questions. As part of the first research question, the chronic disease burden measure
of PCPCHs was compared pre-post PCPCH recognition to their community
comparators (practices within their respective PCPCH communities) to determine
whether PCPCHs are changing the types of patients they served based on the levels of
chronic disease burden in PCPCHs after clinic recognition. To help answer Research
Questions 2 and 3, the average chronic disease burden measure for PCPCHs was
stratified into high and low chronic disease burden groups based on the median
chronic disease burden measure, which was used to evaluate associations between
high and low chronic disease burden PCPCHs and their utilization and expenditures
for PC, ED, and IP.
Primary care expenditures by PCPCHs and their comparators. Primary
care (PC) expenditures by chronic disease burden levels (high versus low) were
determined and compared pre-post PCPCH recognition between PCPCH and their
community comparators to determine the differences in primary care use by high and
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low chronic disease burden groups. Comparing PC expenditures between high and
low chronic disease burden groups in PCPCHs helped capture PC expenditures by
each chronic disease burden group and determine whether high chronic disease
burden patients used more primary care services. This comparison is important
because engaging patients by providing them with more appropriate primary care
services upstream is expected to reduce the misuse and overuse of ED and IP
utilization downstream. Variations in primary care expenditures by the high and low
chronic disease burden PCPCHs and their community comparators will provide
insights into the relative effectiveness of the application of the PCPCH model.
Average ED and IP expenditures by PCPCHs and their comparators. The
expenditures for ED and IP by high and low chronic disease burden PCPCHs were
evaluated separately. As part of this process, the high and low chronic disease burden
groups for PCPCHs, as well as the high and low chronic disease burden PCPCHs and
their respective community comparators, were compared pre-post PCPCH
recognition to their respective comparators to determine the differences in ED and IP
expenditures by the different chronic disease burden groups and whether high chronic
disease burden PCPCHs achieved more savings from engaging more high chronic
disease burden patients. While ED and IP use are important elements of effective
health care delivery, higher levels of ED and inpatient expenditures are considered
ineffective (i.e. overuse and misuse). The evidence suggests that some ED and IP
utilization can be avoided through effective upstream care in ambulatory settings
(Berwick, Nolan, & Whittington, 2008; Ansari, 2007; Peikes, Dale, Lundquist,
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Genevro, & Meyers, 2011). Because the overuse of ED and IP care exerts upward
pressure on health care costs, ED and inpatient utilization have become important
outcome metrics for policy decisions on the relative effectiveness of the application
of PCPCHs (Cooley, McAllister, Sherrieb, & Kuhlthau, 2009).
Independent/Case-Matching Variables
The following independent variables will also be utilized for this research:
age, gender, health insurance type, and ZIP codes of PCPCH clinics. These
independent variables will be aggregated, weighted, and used to construct PCPCH
comparator groups for the comparative analysis of the application of PCPCHs. This
matching approach is similar to propensity score matching and will help compare
PCPCHs to their respective community comparators based on similar patient
characteristics. PCPCHs and their communities will not be matched on the chronic
disease burden measure. Instead, the chronic disease burden measure will be stratified
to high and low chronic disease burden groups and used as explained above to
evaluate PC, ED, and IP utilization and expenditures by PCPCHs and their respective
comparator groups.
Age. The natural cycle of human aging, morbidity, and mortality makes age a
relevant variable in chronic disease burden (health risks) analysis. The evidence
supports the association between aging, health care utilization, and costs (Wolff,
Starfield, & Anderson, 2002). About 90 percent of Medicare spending is incurred on
elderly patients because of their chronic conditions (AHRQ, 2011). Until recent
improvements in predictive modeling on health risks as a metric for profiling
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providers and patients, age was the primary variable for such predictions (Center for
Health Program Development and Management, 2003; Winkelman & Mehmud,
2007). The evidence of association between aging, chronic disease burden, and
outcomes is strong. Wolff, Starfield, & Anderson (2002) found associations between
aging, the risks of chronic conditions and higher health care expenditures. Higher
utilization and health expenditures have also been found among younger age groups.
Neff, Sharp, Muldoon, Graham & Myers (2004) found that chronic conditions in
pediatric populations in Washington State accounted for disproportionately higher
health care expenditures. Shi and Lu (2000) suggested that children between 0-15
years and children who are black had higher rates of hospitalizations. The National
Hospital Ambulatory Medical Care Survey also found that about a quarter of the
115.3 million ED utilizations in 2005 were by pediatric patients (Nawar, Niska, &
Xu, 2007). The above evidence supports the inclusion of age as a predictor of chronic
disease burden and utilization. Including age as a predictor and matching variable will
help account for some of the variation in health outcomes.
Gender. In accordance with most studies on health risks, this study will
include and account for the effects of gender on utilization and outcomes because the
evidence suggests that health risks, utilization, and health care costs vary by gender.
For example, while males have comparatively higher rates of preventable
hospitalizations for primary care related conditions, females have comparatively
higher health care utilization than men (Culler, Parchman, & Przybylski, 1998;
Zaslavsky & Epstein, 2005). Most health insurance rates accordingly vary by gender
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(Center for Health Program Development and Management, 2003; Winkelman &
Mehmud, 2007). Gender will also be used as a case-matching variable for community
comparators.
Health insurance type. The availability and affordability of health insurance
are important predictors of access to health care services, especially in market-based
delivery systems. Starfield and Shi (2004) posited that providing access to health
insurance can improve the effectiveness of MHs through reduced ED and IP
utilization because most people without health insurance tend to utilize ED for their
primary care needs. Billings, Anderson, and Newman (1996) found that low-income
patients in poor health had high rates of ED and preventable hospitalization because
of their health insurance status.
In Oregon, Wallace, McConnell, Gallia, and Smith (2008) found that
increasing the copay for some population groups affected their access to care as well
as their use of ED and IP care and other health services. Saha, Solotaroff, Oster, and
Bindman (2007) also found that access to the Oregon Health Plan generally resulted
in reduced ED and inpatient utilization. Among other studies that corroborate the
association between health insurance status and the use of ED and IP care include
Kogan et al. (1995), Hoffman and Paradise (2008), and Murty, Beglay, & Swint
(2011). Based on the above evidence, health insurance type was included as a
predictor and case-matching variable for creating community comparators.
ZIP codes of PCPCHs. The community location of PCPCH clinics is
important to this research because of evidence suggesting that health, health care
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utilization and outcomes differ in various geographic locations and are affected by
various social and economic factors as well (Healthy People, 2020). Figure 3.1 below,
broadly capture the social and economic factors that tend to differ by geographic
location and have been found to significantly determine levels of access to health care
services and the quality of health.
Figure 3.1
Social Determinants of Health & Equity

Source: Oregon Medicaid Advisory Committee (2017)

The Healthy People 2020 initiative defines the determinants of health to
include the geographic conditions into which people grow, live, work and age, these
conditions include housing, education, employment, access to health care,
transportation, and neighborhood environments. There is growing evidence
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suggesting that chronic conditions and their associated health risks and outcomes vary
by geographic locations (Starfield, Shi, & Macinko, 2005). Goodman et al. (2003)
and DiLia (2003) found that preventable hospitalizations differed by geographic
location. Various international studies corroborate that access to primary health care
services in some communities significantly improved utilization and outcomes. For
example, a United Kingdom study found that timely access, measured by the travel
time to a primary care provider, was associated with reduced “self-referred ED visits”
(Cowling et al., 2013).
Based on the above evidence that health outcomes varied by geographic
location and access to primary care services, the ZIP code of patients will be utilized
for case-matching to construct community comparators. The Primary Care Service
Area (PCSA), which includes ZIP codes, has been previously used for measuring
community effects in health care, but this study will use only ZIP codes because they
are sufficient to create PCPCH comparators.
Empirical Methods
The natural experimental design relies on difference-in difference (D-in-D)
models to empirically estimate the policy effects of the introduction of PCPCH. The
policy effects are measured as the pre-post DD in the chronic disease burden levels of
patients, the use of primary care services by chronic disease burden groups (high and
low), and ED and IP utilization by chronic disease burden between PCPCHs and nonPCPCH comparators. The use of DD helps accomplish two specific research
objectives: (1) measure specific outcome differences from the introduction of
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PCPCHs from two different time periods (pre-post), and (2) compare the outcome
differences between PCPCHs and non-PCPCH comparators (Buckley & Shang,
2003). D-in-D estimation is often used for measuring exogenous variation from
policy or program changes. At the core of D-in-D methods is the source of exogenous
variation and the interaction effects over time (Bertrand, Duflo, & Mullainathan,
2001).
The aggregated PCPCH observations were used in a case-matching process to
construct comparator groups as explained above. This process made patients in
PCPCHs and their community comparators (non-PCPCHs) similar. As part of the
process, each PCPCH practice in the study sample was matched by a national
provider identifier (prov_npi) to a comparator practice that was similar in terms of
patients’ age, gender, health insurance type, and ZIP code of practice. The chronic
disease burden measure was organized and used differently (as described above) to
determine whether PC, ED, and IP expenditures differed based on the chronic disease
burden of PCPCHs and their community comparators.
Like studies that have used control groups, the community comparator groups
will not experience any intervention or treatment but are constructed to be like the
treatment groups (PCPCHs) in all other study characteristics. An underlying
assumption for this method is that the intervention and control groups will be the
same or similar over time if there were no PCPCH policy changes (Meyer, 1995;
Bertrand, Duflo, & Mullainathan, 2001; Chunrong & Norton, 2003). This approach to
constructing PCPCH comparators is similar to propensity score matching
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(Rosenbaum & Rubin, 1983). This matching method provides a robust approach to
balancing covariates between PCPCHs, and their community comparators both
improve the criteria for selection into the comparator groups and reduce confounding.
The use of DD for this research provides flexibility for estimation and power to detect
small treatment effects (Buckley & Shang, 2003).
Evidence Base for Empirical Methods
DD methods have been used in health services research to measure the effects
of various policy changes. Examples of DD estimation in Medical Homes research
include the following: David, Gunnarsson, Saynisch, Chawla, and Nigam (2015) on
the effects of MHs on ED utilization among chronic care patients; and Werner,
Duggan, Duey, Zhu, & Stuart (2013) and Friedberg, Schneider, Rosenthal, Volpp, &
Werner (2014) on the effects of PCMHs on health care utilization, quality of care, and
costs. Other DD methods include the following: Wallace, McConnell, Gallia, &
Smith (2008) on investigating the effects of copayment policy change on the
utilization of medical care and health care expenditures for patients in the Oregon
Health Plan; Gelmon, Wallace, Sandberg, Petchel, & Bouranis (2016) on evaluating
the implementation of Oregon’s PCPCH program; Currie & Gruber (2002) on
evaluating the effects of Medicaid on health care, labor supply, and the Temporary
Aid to Needy Families (TANF) program.
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Difference-in-Difference (D-in-D) Models
This section explains the four main D-in-D models and their variants used for
estimating the short-term policy effects of the application of PCPCHs in Oregon. This
research estimated four main different D-in-D models. The short term is defined in
this research as about three years after PCPCH policy implementation, from October
2011 to September 2014. The D-in-D models are shown in Equations 1, 2, 3, and 4.
Models 1 and 2 are utilized to answer Research Questions 1 and 2, while Model 3
will be used to answer Research Question 3. Model 2 was re-estimated based on split
samples of the analytic file that stratified the aggregate average chronic disease
burden measure into high and low average chronic disease burden groups. This
stratification helped evaluate the effects of primary care utilization by the high and
low chronic disease burden groups. Model 3 was estimated twice (Model 3a and
Model 3b) on split analytic data files for high and low average chronic disease burden
groups. Model 3a was used for estimating outcomes in the high chronic disease
burden PCPCHs and their community comparators, while Model 3b was used for
estimating outcomes in the low chronic disease burden PCPCHs and their community
comparators. Models 5 and 6 were used to estimate the additive effects of the
application of PCPCHs.
Model 1. The first model was developed based on the first research question:
1. What is the average chronic disease burden of PCPCHs, and how does
their average chronic disease burden compare to the communities
PCPCHs are in pre-post PCPCH recognition?
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Average chronic disease burden of PCPCHs and their comparator groups it
= α PCPCH it + π POST t + β PCPCH it* POST t + е it (1)
In Model 1, the average chronic disease burden of PCPCHs and their comparator
groups was the outcome of interest; i is the aggregate observations of PCPCHs and
their comparators (1….n), where each i accordingly has twice the number of practices
because each PCPCH has a matched comparator practice; t represents the time period
effects, which takes on the values of 0 for pre-treatment and 1 for post-treatment
periods, respectively; PCPCH represents primary care practices that were recognized
by the state as PCPCHs and will take on the value 1 for PCPCHs and 0 for
community comparators (non PCPCHs). Community comparators were constructed
from a case-matching approach that utilized four of the predictor variables (explained
above). α is the coefficient of the difference between PCPCHs and their community
comparators over time; π the coefficient of time (pre-post); and β the coefficient of
interaction between PCPCHs and time; β is also the coefficient of interest because it
captured the policy effects. The policy effects of the introduction of PCPCHs on
chronic disease burden levels is determined by the magnitude and direction of the
coefficients. The coefficients provide an estimate of the overall effects of the policy
change on chronic disease burden levels in PCPCHs and their comparator groups; e it
represents the error term. The error term is assumed to be uncorrelated and has a
mean of 0 and an unknown variance (Buckley & Shang, 2003, Meyer, 1995).
Model 2. The second model was developed based on the second research
question:
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2. How do primary care expenditures change based on the chronic disease
burden of PCPCHs?
Average primary care expenditure by the chronic disease burden levels of
PCPCHs and their comparator groups it = α PCPCH it + π POST t + β
PCPCH it* POST t + е it (2)
In Model 2, primary care use by the average chronic disease burden of PCPCHs and
their comparator groups represents the outcome of interest. This measure captures the
intensity of primary care use and expenditure levels by high and low chronic disease
burden patients in PCPCHs and PCPCHs and their community comparators. The
outcome variable was derived from aggregating primary care expenditures per patient
per PCPCH per quarter, then weighting the aggregate primary care expenditures by
the average chronic disease burden for each group (high and low). The comparator
groups were constructed from case matching; i in the model represents PCPCH
practices (1….n), where each i accordingly has twice the number of practices because
each PCPCH has a matched comparator practice; t is the time period effects, which
takes on the values 0 for pre-treatment and 1 for post-treatment periods, respectively;
PCPCH will take on the value 1 for PCPCHs and 0 for community comparators; α is
the coefficient of the differences between PCPCHs and their communities over time;
π the coefficient of time (pre-post); and β the coefficient of the interaction between
PCPCHs and time. β is the coefficient of interest because it captured the policy
effects. The policy effects of the introduction of PCPCHs on the intensity of primary
care use in PCPCHs was determined by the magnitude and direction of the
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coefficients, e it in the model represents the error term, which is assumed to be
uncorrelated and has a mean of 0 and an unknown variance (Buckley & Shang, 2003,
Meyer, 1995).
Model 3. The third model was developed based on research question 3:
3. Do PCPCHs that engage more high chronic disease burden patients have
more reductions in ED and IP expenditures?
Y it = α PCPCHK it + π POST t + β PCPCHK it* POST t + е it (3)
As part of this estimation, the analytic data file was split into high and low average
chronic disease burden groups based on the median chronic disease burden measure.
Model 3 was run twice on the two-separate chronic disease burden groups (high and
low) for PCPCHs and their comparators to determine whether ED and IP utilization
was different among the high and low chronic disease burden groups. Y it in Model 3
represents the outcome variables of interest, namely average IP utilization and
average ED utilization for the high chronic disease burden group PCPCHs and their
community comparators; i is the number of practices (1….n), where each i will
accordingly have twice the number of practices because each PCPCH has a matched
comparator practice; t will represent the time period effects, which takes on the values
0 for pre-treatment and 1 for post-treatment periods, respectively. PCPCHK
represents IP and ED utilization by high chronic disease burden PCPCHs and their
comparators; α is the coefficient that measures the difference in ED or IP use for high
chronic disease burden PCPCHs and their comparators over time; π will be the
coefficient of time (pre-post); and β the coefficient of the interaction between
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PCPCHK and time. β is also the coefficient of interest because it captures the policy
effects of the introduction of PCPCHs on the high chronic disease burden PCPCHs
and their comparators; eit , on the other hand, represents the error term and like other
equations, the error term is assumed to be uncorrelated and has a mean of 0 and an
unknown variance (Buckley & Shang, 2003; Meyer, 1995).
The policy effects of ED and IP utilization was evaluated by re-estimating
Equation 3 to determine the utilization of ED and IP in the low chronic disease
burden PCPCHs and their community comparators, then comparing the difference in
ED and IP utilization among low and high chronic disease burden groups. Equation 3
was rerun as Model 3b on the low chronic disease burden PCPCHs and their
comparators as specified below:
M it = α PCPCHK it + π POST t + β PCPCHK it* POST t + е it (3b)
The elements of Model 3b are the same as in Model 3 above. The only difference is
the outcome variable of interest denoted by M it, which represents average IP
utilization or average ED utilization for low chronic disease burden PCPCHs and
their community comparators. M it is the outcome variable of interest. The overall
effect was determined based on the magnitude and direction of the coefficients β in
the high and low chronic disease burden groups.
Models 4 and 5. To help determine the additive effects of the application of
the PCPCH model on total ED, IP, and PC utilizations between PCPCHs and their
community comparators, Models 4 and 5 were run to examine the different scenario
effects. The policy effects of ED plus IP utilization were evaluated by estimating
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Equation 4 to determine the utilization of ED plus IP for the low and high chronic
disease burden group PCPCHs and their community comparators, then comparing the
difference in ED plus IP utilization among low and high chronic disease burden
groups. Equation 4 was run twice as specified below for high and low chronic disease
burden groups:
A it = α PCPCHK it + π POST t + β PCPCHK it* POST t + е it (4)
The elements of Model 4 are the same as in earlier models above. The only difference
is the outcome variable of interest denoted by A it, which represents average (ED plus
IP) utilization for high chronic disease burden group and average (ED plus IP)
utilization for low chronic disease burden PCPCHs and their community comparators.
A it is the outcome variable of interest. The overall effect was determined based on
the magnitude and direction of the coefficients β in the high and low chronic disease
burden groups.
Model 5 was also run to examine the different scenario effects. Specifically,
the policy effects of ED plus IP plus PC utilization were evaluated by estimating
Equation 5 to determine the utilization of ED plus IP plus PC for the low and high
chronic disease burden PCPCHs and their community comparators, then comparing
the difference in ED plus IP plus PC utilization among low and high chronic disease
burden groups. Equation 5 was run twice as specified below for high and low chronic
disease burden PCPCHs and their comparators:
B it = α PCPCHK it + π POST t + β PCPCHK it* POST t + е it (4)

HEALTH RISKS IN MEDICAL HOMES AND THEIR EFFECTS

94

The elements of Model 5 are the same as in earlier models above. The only difference
is the outcome variable of interest denoted by B it, which represents average (ED plus
IP plus PC) utilization for high chronic disease burden group PCPCHs and their
community comparators and average (ED plus IP plus PC) utilization for low chronic
disease burden PCPCHs and their community comparators. A it is a binary outcome
variable of interest. The overall effect was determined based on the magnitude and
direction of the coefficients β in the high and low chronic disease burden groups.
Statistical Analysis
This research used two models, a fixed effect and a generalized linear model
(GLM) approach that included standard specifications for estimating the four DD
models above. Data on the dependent variables were entered natively and specified to
run exponential models. Log-link transformations make the dependent variables
linear forms; the coefficients of the log-link transformed models become elasticities
and are interpreted as measures of the rate of change in the dependent variables.
Among studies that have used this approach include Wallace, McConnell, Gallia, &
Smith (2008) on the effects of copayment policy change on the utilization of medical
care and health care expenditures for patients in the Oregon Health Plan. All models
used the Huber-White-sandwich standard error (SE) estimation approach to help
adjust for the effects of heteroskedasticity and repeated observations from before and
after PCPCH recognition (Huber, 1967; White, 1980; Manning, 1998).
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Limitations of Research Methods
The main limitations include the definition of community, the match and
comparison of high and low chronic disease burden PCPCHs to their control groups,
and the use of the average chronic disease burden measure as a proxy measure for
health risks. Community in this research was defined more narrowly than the Office
of Rural Health Policy (2016) in Oregon’s definition of “contiguous ZIP codes within
specified primary care service areas” (p.3). This research constructed community
comparators through a case-matching of ZIP codes of patients as well as age, gender,
and health insurance types. This approach to creating community comparators helped
match and compare high and low chronic disease burden PCPCH clinics to
comparators based on the types of patients served in their respective community
locations. This matching approach assumed that high and low chronic disease burden
PCPCH patients will reflect their communities, but the results of the research suggest
that high and low chronic disease burden PCPCHs do not currently reflect the
communities in which they operate. This research compared high chronic disease
burden PCPCHs to their high chronic disease burden community comparators, but the
results suggest that comparing high chronic disease burden PCPCHs to their low
chronic disease burden comparators could have produced more significant effects on
outcomes.
The use of the All Payer All Claims (APAC) secondary data system-imposed
limitations because the data contained large missing health risk scores for patients
whose conditions were not yet considered high risk because their health care episodes
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had not reached chronic thresholds for generating health risk scores. A chronic
disease burden was therefore developed and used as a proxy health risk measure. This
chronic disease burden measure may have been limited in accuracy because it was
based on 10 variable markers of chronic disease burden measures that were available
in the APAC data. This measure may not have fully captured health risks because its
construction did not include other elements of a comprehensive health risk measure.
While other studies have used similar measures on patients’ chronic conditions as
proxy health risk measures, health risk scores and the number of patients’ chronic
conditions produce similar results, but they are different.
As measures of health risks, risk scores are more comprehensive than chronic
conditions and have more predictive power because they include more variables that
help comprehensively evaluate current and future health risks. This research is also a
short-term study that used data on the first wave of PCPCH attestations from October
2011 through September 2014. PCPCH attestation data collection at the practice level
has improved since the first wave of data collection. The results of this research may
therefore not capture such improvements. The results may also have limited
generalizability because they are exclusive to the application of Oregon’s PCPCH
model.
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Chapter 4: Results
The purpose of this chapter is to provide the results of the research, which are
organized in tables with explanations for each table. The chapter will begin with a
summary of the data analysis and regression models that were estimated to provide
context for the results that follow. Preceding each table will be the associated research
question, then the explanation of the results in each table. Collectively, the tables and
explanations provide answers to the research questions. The tables are designed in
similar format: They include similar comparative elements and are presented in the
order in which they explain each research question.
Summary of Data Analysis
There are six main sets of results for the four research questions; the results
include two additional tables that provide perspectives on the additive effects of the
implementation of PCPCHs on the outcomes of this research. All analyses used
difference-in-difference (D-in-D) methods with four main sets of dependent variables,
one for each research question. For each table, the main result that will be reported is
the beta (coefficient) of change, which measures the pre-post PCPCH policy effects
for the control group and the pre-post PCPCH policy effects for the intervention
group; and the D-in-D, which measures the policy effects of the changes in the
treatment group based on the changes in their respective control group. The results
represent practice-level effects per quarter. Therefore, the changes displayed in the
result tables are interpreted as average quarterly changes in the dependent variables
per patients within practice quarters.
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Two separate modified D-in-D regression models were estimated using
STATA 15. Both models used random effects to account for differences in average
levels of dependent variables across observations. The recognition of primary care
clinics as PCPCHs began in October 2011 and is ongoing; because the recognition
schedule for primary care clinics as PCPCH varied in this study by different start
dates, quarterly time dummy variables were used to adjust for the different start dates
and account for the differences across time. The results tables show these regression
results as Model 1 and Model 2. The betas in Model 1 are interpreted as the
magnitude of change in the dependent variable. The betas in Model 2 are interpreted
as the rates of change in the dependent variables. Model 2 used a generalized linear
model (GLM) approach with log transformations of the variables into linear forms.
All regression models adjusted for the standard errors for repeated measures and
generalized heteroskedasticity (Huber, 1967; White, 1980; Manning, 1998).
The proxy health risk measure for this research (chronic disease burden
measure) was developed from aggregates of 10 chronic conditions (Ash & Ellis,
2012; Hornbrook & Goodman, 1996; Ash et al., 2000). Individual chronic disease
burden was based on aggregates of the 10 chronic conditions described earlier in
Chapters 2 and 3, while practice level chronic disease burden was measured as the
average of practices’ patient level chronic disease burden. The practice level chronic
disease burden measure was stratified into high and low chronic disease burden
groups based on the median PCPCH chronic disease burden measure and was used
for the analysis in two ways: (1) stratifying PCPCH observations into high and low
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chronic disease burden groups for comparison, and (2) stratifying PCPCH
observations and their respective community comparators into high and low chronic
disease burden groups based on the PCPCH chronic disease burden level, then
comparing the chronic disease burden in PCPCHs (high and low) accordingly with
their respective community comparator groups.
To provide additional insights into the comparative analysis of PCPCHs by
high and low chronic disease burden groups, the average changes in the dependent
variables for Research Questions 2 and 3 were measured from three different
perspectives: comparing high and low chronic disease burden PCPCHs, comparing
low chronic disease burden PCPCHs to their respective chronic disease burden
community comparators, and comparing high chronic disease burden PCPCHs to
their respective chronic disease burden community comparators. The different levels
of comparison helped assess whether the comparison of high versus low chronic
disease burden PCPCHs did not simply reflect differences in the PCPCH
communities.
Results
Research Question 1. The first research question is the following: What is
the average chronic disease burden of PCPCHs, and how does their average chronic
disease burden compare to the communities PCPCHs are in pre-post PCPCH
recognition?
The dependent variable is chronic disease burden of PCPCHs and their community
comparators, and the results are interpreted as changes in the chronic disease burden
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based on a measurement scale of 0-8. Table 4.1 below shows the chronic disease
burden of PCPCHs and their community comparators during the study period and the
distribution of patient characteristics among PCPCHs and their community
comparator observations. It can be inferred from Table 4.1 that the chronic disease
burden of PCPCHs and their community comparators was different pre-policy
implementation, about 0.89 for PCPCH and about 0.95 for the community comparator
group. A two-tailed t test was used to determine whether the difference in the chronic
disease burden between PCPCHs and their communities was significantly different
than zero. The result, t (9) = 3.72, p < 0.05, suggested that the difference in the
chronic disease burden was statistically significant and therefore different than zero.
This result suggested that the chronic disease burden of PCPCHs and their
communities was significantly different pre-PCPCH policy implementation.
PCPCHs and their communities were also similar on the 10 markers of
chronic disease burden measures, except for other behavioral health: 23.4 percent and
30.5 percent for PCPCHs and their communities, respectively. A two-tailed t test was
used to determine whether the difference in other behavioral health between PCPCHs
and their communities was significantly different than zero. The result, t (1) = 39.42,
p < 0.01, suggested that the difference in other behavioral health was statistically
significant and therefore different than zero. This result suggested that the difference
in other behavioral health patients in PCPCHs and their communities was
significantly different. Since PCPCHs and their community comparators were not
matched on the chronic disease burden, the proportional difference in other
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behavioral health therefore reflects a marker of how PCPCHs are different than their
community comparators.
Table 4.1
Patient Characteristics in PCPCHs and Their Community Comparators
Table 4.1
Patient Characteristics in PCPCHs and their Community Comparators

Provider Quarters
Average Chronicity
Gender
Female
Male
Age Groups
0 -1
1-2
3-5
6-11
12-17
18-25
26-35
36-45
46-55
56-64
64+
*p<=.05
**p<=.01

PCPCH
5,442
0.89

Community
5,442
0.95

58.3%
41.7%

58.2%
41.8%

3.1%
3.5%
7.7%
8.0%
8.7%
7.1%
10.1%
10.8%
13.1%
13.4%
14.5%

3.1%
3.5%
7.7%
8.0%
8.7%
7.2%
9.9%
10.9%
13.2%
13.5%
14.3%

Sig
*

Payer Types
Medicaid
Medicare
Private
Chronic Conditions
COPD
Schizophrenia
Affective Disorder
Other Behavioral Health
Diabetes
Chronic Heart Failure
Chronic Kidney Disease
Cardiovascular Disease
Coronary Heart Disease
Obesity

PCPCH

Community

53.7%
10.4%
35.9%

54.1%
10.3%
35.6%

19.2%
1.7%
10.0%
23.4%
12.6%
3.5%
2.8%
5.4%
5.6%
4.8%

18.6%
1.7%
10.0%
30.5%
12.0%
3.5%
2.9%
5.2%
5.7%
4.6%

Sig

**

Table 4.2 below shows the results on the changes in the chronic disease
burden post-PCPCH policy implementation. The change in chronic disease burden
community comparators post measures the average change in the chronic disease
burden for the community pre-post PCPCH policy implementation. Change in
chronic disease burden PCPCH post measures the average change in the chronic
disease burden for PCPCHs pre-post PCPCH policy implementation. The D-in-D
measures the difference-in-difference of the average changes in the chronic disease
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burden for PCPCHs relative to the average change for the community comparator
groups and thus provides the overall effect attributable to the PCPCH program.
Table 4.2
Average Changes in Chronic Disease Burden by PCPCHs
Table 4.2
Average Changes in Chronic Disease Burden by PCPCHs
Model 1
Model 2
Beta
SE P>|Z| Sig Beta
SE P>|Z| Sig
Change in chronic disease burden community comparators post 0.013 0.01 0.19
1.41% 0.010 0.177
Change in chronic disease burden PCPCH post
0.015 0.01 0.22
1.07% 0.013 0.403
D-in-D
0.001 0.01 0.92
-0.34% 0.015 0.818
*p<= .05
**p<= .01

Note: Betas in Model 1 are interpreted as the magnitude of change in the dependent variable and the
betas in Model 2 are interpreted as the rates of change in the dependent variable.

The betas (coefficients) of 0.013 and 0.015 in Model 1 show that the chronic
disease burden increased in PCPCHs and their community comparators on the
chronic disease burden scale. The results in Model 2 also suggest that the average rate
of changes in the chronic disease burden in PCPCHs and their community
comparators were about 1.4 percent and 1.1 percent, respectively. The D-in-D
suggests that the policy effects of PCPCH implementation resulted in an increase of
about 0.001 in the chronic disease burden in PCPCHs and a decrease of about 0.3
percent in the chronic disease burden in PCPCHs. However, none of the results was
statistically significant and therefore indicates that the chronic disease burden in
PCPCHs did not change after clinics were recognized as PCPCHs either alone or in
comparison to their communities. The hypothesis that the chronic disease burden in
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PCPCHs will increase because PCPCHs will engage more chronic care patients was
not supported by the results.
Research Question 2. The second research question is the following: How do
primary care expenditures change based on the chronic disease burden of PCPCHs?
The dependent variable for this question was average primary care expenditure per
patient within a practice quarter, which was evaluated from three different
perspectives. First, average changes were compared in primary care expenditures for
high and low chronic disease burden PCPCHs. Second, average changes were
compared in primary care expenditures for low chronic disease burden PCPCHs and
their community comparators. Finally, average changes were compared in primary
care expenditures for high chronic disease burden PCPCHs and their community
comparators.
The stratification into high and low chronic disease burden groups helped
compare PCPCHs and their community comparators based on the appropriate high
and low chronic disease burden groups: high chronic disease burden PCPCHs and
their communities; low chronic disease burden PCPCHs and their communities. Table
4.3 below shows the characteristics of the high and low average chronic disease
burden patients. In addition to the differences in the high and low chronic disease
burden groups, the characteristics of patients in Table 4.3 indicate that there were
more older patients in the high chronic disease burden group, for example, 22.8
percent in the 64 and above age group, but only 7.0 percent of this age group was in
the low chronic disease burden group. There was a slightly higher proportion of
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Medicaid patients in the high chronic disease burden group: 58.1 percent in the high
chronic disease burden group versus 49.1 percent in the low chronic disease burden
group. A higher proportion of the private payer group, 46.2 percent, was in the low
chronic disease burden group, versus 26.1 percent in the high chronic disease burden
group.
A two-tailed t test was used to determine whether the differences in the
chronic disease burden between the high and low average chronic disease burden
PCPCHs was significantly different than zero. The result, t (9) = 4.46, p < 0.05,
suggested that the difference in the chronic disease burden for the high and low
chronic disease burden PCPCHs was statistically significant and therefore different
than zero. This result indicates that the difference in the chronic disease burden for
the high and low chronic disease burden PCPCHs was significantly different.
While the results on the 10 markers of chronic disease burden measures, age,
gender, and payer types for the high and low chronic disease burden groups in Table
4.3 appear statistically different, independent chi square tests were conducted to
determine whether the differences were statistically significant. The result on the 10
markers of chronic disease burden measures, ꭓ2 (9) = 56.92, p < 0.05, suggested that
the difference in the distribution of chronic conditions was statistically significant.
Therefore, the distribution of the markers of the chronic disease burden measures
between high and low chronic disease burden PCPCHs is different. The result on age
groups, ꭓ2 (10) = 47.22, p < 0.05, suggested that the difference in age distribution
was statistically significant. Therefore, the distribution of age between high and low
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chronic disease burden PCPCHs is different. The result on gender, ꭓ2 (1) = 4.13, p <
0.05, suggested that the difference in the distribution of gender was statistically
significant. Therefore, the distribution of gender between high and low chronic
disease burden PCPCHs is different. The result on payer types, ꭓ2 (2) = 12.40, p <
0.05, suggested that the difference in payer types was statistically significant.
Therefore, the distribution of payer types between high and low chronic disease
burden PCPCHs is different.
Table 4.3
Patient Characteristics in High and Low Chronic Disease Burden PCPCHs
Table 4.3
Patient Characteristics in High and Low Chronic Disease Burden PCPCHs

Average chronicity
Gender
Female
Male
Age Groups
0 -1
1-2
3-5
6-11
12-17
18-25
26-35
36-45
46-55
56-64
64+
*p<=.05
**p<=.01

High chronicity Low chronicity
1.18
0.60
57.1%
42.9%

59.5%
40.5%

1.2%
1.4%
3.7%
4.3%
6.1%
7.1%
10.8%
11.9%
15.6%
15.1%
22.8%

5.1%
6.3%
13.6%
12.2%
11.4%
7.0%
8.9%
9.4%
10.1%
9.0%
7.0%

Sig
High chronicity Low chronicity
* Payer Types
58.1%
49.1%
* Medicaid
Medicare
15.9%
4.6%
Private
26.1%
46.2%
* Chronic Conditions
COPD
23.7%
15.0%
Schizophrenia
2.9%
0.6%
Affective Disorder
13.2%
6.8%
Other Behavioral Health
27.1%
19.8%
Diabetes
18.3%
7.0%
Chronic Heart Failure
5.7%
1.4%
Chronic Kidney Disease
4.3%
1.3%
Cardiovascular Disease
8.3%
2.6%
Coronary Heart Disease
8.6%
2.7%
Obesity
6.1%
3.4%

Sig
*

*

Table 4.4 below shows the results on average changes in primary care
expenditures per patient within a practice quarter from the three perspectives.
Changes in the low and high chronic disease burden PCPCH post measures the pre-
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post average change in primary care expenditures for the low and high chronic
disease burden PCPCHs, respectively. Similarly, the change in low chronic disease
burden community comparators post, change in low chronic disease burden PCPCH
post, change in high chronic disease burden community comparators post, and change
in high chronic disease burden PCPCH post measure the pre-post average changes in
primary care expenses for the low chronic disease burden PCPCHs and their
community comparators, and the high chronic disease burden of PCPCHs and their
community comparators, respectively. The D-in-D in each case measures the policy
effects of PCPCH implementation on primary care expenditures from the three
perspectives and shows the results as the magnitude of average changes in primary
care expenditures in Model 1, and the average percentage change in primary care
expenditures in Model 2.
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Table 4.4
Average Changes in Primary Care Spending by PCPCHs

Note: Betas in Model 1 are interpreted as the magnitude of change (change in dollar amount) in the
dependent variable, and the betas in Model 2 are interpreted as the rates of change (percentage change)
in the dependent variable.

The betas (coefficients) in Model 1 for high and low chronic disease burden
PCPCHs correspond with average primary care expenditures per patient within the
practice quarter. The expenditures decreased by $2.56 and $2.43 per patient per
practice quarter for the low and high chronic disease burden PCPCHs, respectively,
while their D-in-D showed an increase of $0.14 per patient per practice quarter, but
the results in Table 4.4 were statistically non-significant. For the low chronic disease
burden PCPCHs and their community comparators, average primary care expense
decreased by $4.12 and $3.33 per patient per practice quarter for the low chronic
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disease burden community comparators and low chronic disease burden PCPCHs,
respectively, and their D-in-D increased $0.79 per patient per practice quarter. For the
high chronic disease burden PCPCHs and their community comparators, the results
suggest that the policy effects of the application of PCPCHs (D-in-D) resulted in a
decrease in the average primary care expenses by $1.94 per patient per practice
quarter for high chronic disease burden PCPCHs.
The results from Model 2 suggest that average primary care expenditures
decreased by about 1.9 percent for the low chronic disease burden PCPCHs and
increased by about 0.6 percent for the high chronic disease burden PCPCHs. Their Din-D increased about 2.5 percent per patient per practice quarter for the low chronic
disease burden PCPCHs and their community comparators. Primary care expense
decreased by 2 percent and by 2.3 percent respective to high and low chronic disease
burden PCPCHs and a 0.4 percent decrease in D-in-D per patient per practice quarter
for the high chronic disease burden PCPCHs and their community comparators.
The policy effects (D-in-D) showed a decrease of about 0.7 percent in primary
care expenditures for the high chronic disease burden PCPCHs per patient per
practice quarter based on the changes in their community comparators. However,
none of the results in Table 4.4 were statistically significant and therefore indicate
that average primary care expense in PCPCHs did not change after clinics were
recognized as PCPCHs either alone or in comparison to their communities. The
results from Table 4.4 do not support the hypothesis that primary care expenses will
increase for high chronic disease burden patients in PCPCH based on their chronic
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disease burden levels because average primary care expenditures decreased for high
chronic disease burden PCPCHs in terms of both magnitude and percentage.
Research Question 3. The third research question is the following: Do
PCPCHs that engage more high chronic disease burden patients have more reductions
in Emergency Department (ED) and Inpatient (IP) expenditures? This question was
evaluated separately for ED expenditures and for IP expenditures; the results are
shown in Tables 4.5 and 4.6, respectively.
Like earlier results and tables, the results in Tables 4.5 and 4.6 are stratified
into high and low chronic disease burden groups and evaluated from the three
different perspectives described above. First, average changes were compared in ED
and IP expenditures for high and low chronic disease burden PCPCHs. Second,
average changes were compared in ED and IP expenditures for low chronic disease
burden PCPCHs and their community comparators. Finally, average changes were
compared in ED and IP expenditures for high chronic disease burden PCPCHs and
their community comparators. The dependent variable for the results in Table 4.5 was
average ED expenditure per patient within the practice quarter.
In Table 4.5 below, changes in the low and high chronic disease burden
PCPCH post measures the pre-post average changes in primary care expenditures for
the low and high chronic disease burden PCPCHs, respectively. Similarly, the change
in low chronic disease burden community comparators post, change in low chronic
disease burden PCPCH post, change in high chronic disease burden community
comparators post, and change in high chronic disease burden PCPCH post measure
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the pre-post average changes in primary care expenses for the low chronic disease
burden PCPCHs and their community comparators, and the high chronic disease
burden PCPCHs and their community comparators, respectively. The D-in-D in each
case measures the policy effects of PCPCH implementation on ED expenditures from
the three perspectives and shows the results as the average change in the magnitude of
ED expenditures in Model 1, and the average percentage change in ED expenditures
in Model 2.
Table 4.5
Average Changes in Emergency Department Spending by PCPCHs

Note: Betas in Model 1 are interpreted as the magnitude of change (change in dollar amount) in the
dependent variable and the betas in Model 2 are interpreted as the rates of change (percentage change)
in the dependent variable.
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The betas (coefficients) in Model 1 for high and low chronic disease burden
PCPCHs correspond with average ED expenditures per patient per practice quarter
and suggest that expenditures decreased by $7.64 and increased by $0.36 per patient
per practice quarter for the low and high chronic disease burden groups, respectively,
while their D-in-D shows a statistically significant average increase of $8.00 per
patient per practice quarter. For the low chronic disease burden PCPCHs and their
comparators, average ED expenses increased by $0.17 and decreased by $4.49 per
patient per practice quarter for the low chronic disease burden community
comparators and low chronic disease burden PCPCHs, respectively, and their D-in-D
decreased $4.66 per patient per practice quarter. For the high chronic disease burden
PCPCHs and their community comparators, the results suggest that the policy effects
of the application of PCPCHs (D-in-D) resulted in an increase in average ED
expenses by $0.24 per patient per practice quarter for high chronic disease burden
PCPCHs relative to the change in the high chronic disease burden community
comparators.
The results from Model 2 show that average ED expenditures decreased by
about 10.9 percent for the low chronic disease burden PCPCHs and increased by
about 0.9 percent for the high chronic disease burden PCPCHs per patient per practice
quarter, and their D-in-D increased about 11.8 percent. For the low chronic disease
burden PCPCHs and their community comparators, ED expenses increased by 1.8
percent and decreased by 6.9 percent, respectively, per patient per practice quarter
and resulted in an 8.7 percent decrease in the policy effects on low chronic disease
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burden PCPCHs. For the high chronic disease burden PCPCHs and their comparators,
the policy effects (D-in-D) resulted in a decrease of about 3.3 percent in average ED
expenditures per patient per practice quarter relative to the change in the high chronic
disease burden community comparators.
The results from Table 4.5 do not support the hypothesis that high chronic
disease burden PCPCHs will achieve comparatively higher reductions in ED
expenditures because average ED expenditures for high chronic disease burden
PCPCHs did not change, while average ED expenditure decreases for low chronic
disease burden PCPCHs were statistically significant. The D-in-D results indicated
that average ED expenditure increases per patient per practice quarter were
statistically significant for the high chronic disease burden PCPCHs in terms of
magnitude and percentage relative to average ED expenditure decreases per patient
per practice quarter for low chronic disease burden PCPCHs, which were statistically
significantly while high chronic disease burden PCPCHs stayed flat.
Research Question 3b. The second iteration of the third research question is
the following: Do PCPCHs that engage more high chronic disease burden patients
have more reductions in Inpatient (IP) expenditures? This section of results is focused
on IP expenditures by chronic disease burden levels, with results shown in Table 4.6
below. The dependent variable for the results in Table 4.6 was average IP expenditure
per patient within the practice quarter.
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Table 4.6
Average Changes in Inpatient Spending by PCPCHs

Note: Betas in Model 1 are interpreted as the magnitude of change (change in dollar amount) in the
dependent variable, and the betas in Model 2 are interpreted as the rates of change (percentage change)
in the dependent variable.

The betas (coefficients) in Model 1 for high and low chronic disease burden
PCPCHs correspond to average IP expenditures per patient per practice quarter and
suggest that expenditures decreased by $11.18 and increased by $4.99 per patient per
practice quarter for the low and high chronic disease burden groups, respectively,
while their D-in-D increased by $16.17 per patient per practice quarter. For the low
chronic disease burden PCPCHs and their comparators, average IP expenses
decreased by $1.52 and $6.68 per patient per practice quarter for the low chronic
disease burden community comparators and low chronic disease burden PCPCHs,
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respectively, and their D-in-D decreased $5.16 per patient per practice quarter. For
the high chronic disease burden PCPCHs and their community comparators, the
results suggest that the policy effects of the application of PCPCHs (D-in-D) resulted
in an increase in average IP expenses by $8.85 per patient per practice quarter for
high chronic disease burden PCPCHs compared to their community comparators.
The results from Model 2 suggest that average IP expenditures increased by
about 2.2 percent for the low chronic disease burden PCPCHs and by about 14.3
percent for the high chronic disease burden PCPCHs per patient per practice quarter,
with a significant D-in-D increase of about 12.1 percent. For the low chronic disease
burden PCPCHs and their community comparators, IP expenses decreased by 0.6
percent and by 0.9 percent, respectively, per patient per practice quarter, with a 0.3
percent comparative decrease in the policy effects of PCPCHs on low chronic disease
burden PCPCHs. For the high chronic disease burden PCPCHs and their comparators,
the policy effects (D-in-D) show a significant increase of about 5.4 percent in average
IP expenditures per patient per practice quarter for high chronic disease burden
PCPCHs compared to their community comparators.
The results from Table 4.6 do not support the hypothesis that high chronic
disease burden PCPCHs will achieve comparatively higher reductions in IP
expenditures. The D-in-D results suggest that average IP expenditures per patient per
practice quarter increased for the high chronic disease burden PCPCHs in magnitude
and was statistically significantly in percentage terms, but comparatively, average IP
expenditures per patient per practice quarter for the low chronic disease burden
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PCPCHs did not change. This result indicates that the policy effects of the
implementation of PCPCHs increased average IP expenditures in proportion for the
high chronic disease burden PCPCHs relative to IP expenditures for the low chronic
disease burden PCPCHs that did not change.
To contextualize the policy effects of the application of PCPCHs, the models
were rerun first on the sum of ED plus IP, then on the sum of ED plus IP plus PC to
determine the additive effects on average changes in ED plus IP expenditures, and on
average changes in ED plus IP plus PC expenditures for high chronic disease burden
patients, respectively. Table 4.7 below shows the results on average ED plus IP
expenditures while Table 4.8 shows the results on average ED plus IP plus PC
expenditures. The dependent variable for the results in Tables 4.7 and 4.8 was the
sum of average ED and IP expenditures per patient within the practice quarter, and
the sum of ED and IP and PC expenditures per patient within the practice quarter,
respectively.
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Table 4.7
Average Changes in Emergency Department and Inpatient Spending by PCPCHs

Note: Betas in Model 1 are interpreted as the magnitude of change (change in dollar amount) in the
dependent variable, and the betas in Model 2 are interpreted as the rates of change (percentage change)
in the dependent variable.

The results from Table 4.7 confirm the earlier results above on average ED
and IP expenditures by different chronic disease burden levels. The beta (coefficients)
on the policy effects of the application of PCPCHs (D-in-D) for high chronic disease
burden PCPCHs suggests that average ED plus IP expenditures increased in
magnitude and percentage for the high chronic disease burden PCPCHs by $24.28
and 11.8 percent, respectively, but decreased for the low chronic disease burden
PCPCHs by $9.73 and 2.1 percent per patient per practice quarter, respectively. For
high chronic disease burden PCPCHs, the D-in-D results suggest that average ED
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plus IP expenditures increased by about $9.34 and by 3.75 percent per patient per
practice quarter, respectively, for high chronic disease burden PCPCHs compared to
their high chronic disease burden community comparators. However, only the
proportional change in D-in-D for the high chronic disease burden PCPCHs was
statistically significant. This result indicates that the policy effects of the
implementation of PCPCHs increased average ED plus IP expenditures in proportion
for the high chronic disease burden PCPCHs relative to ED plus IP expenditures for
the low chronic disease burden PCPCHs that did not change.
The results from Table 4.8 below also confirm earlier results above on
average ED, IP, and PC expenditures by different chronic disease burden levels. The
beta (coefficients) on the policy effects of the application of PCPCHs (D-in-D) for
high chronic disease burden PCPCHs suggests that average ED plus IP plus PC
expenditures increased in magnitude and percentage terms for the high chronic
disease burden PCPCHs by $23.23 and 6.1 percent per patient per practice quarter,
respectively, but decreased for the low chronic disease burden PCPCHs by $8.89 and
1.6 percent per patient per practice quarter, respectively. For the high chronic disease
burden PCPCHs, the D-in-D results suggest that average ED plus IP plus PC
expenditures increased by about $6.76 and by 1.2 percent per patient per practice
quarter, respectively, for high chronic disease burden PCPCHs compared to their high
chronic disease burden community comparators. However, none of the results were
statistically significant and therefore indicated that average ED plus IP plus PC
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expenses did not change after clinics were recognized as PCPCHs either alone or in
comparison to their communities.
Table 4.8
Average Changes in Emergency Department, Inpatient, and Primary Care Spending by
PCPCHs

Note: Betas in Model 1 are interpreted as the magnitude of change (change in dollar amount) in the
dependent variable, and the betas in Model 2 are interpreted as the rates of change (percentage change)
in the dependent variable.

Summary of Results
The results of the research suggest that the hypotheses that the recognition of
primary care clinics as PCPCHs will increase chronic disease burden levels in
PCPCHs because the model’s approach to care will benefit high chronic disease
burden patients, increase primary care expenditures for high chronic disease burden
PCPCHs, and reduce ED and IP utilizations and expenditures for high chronic disease
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burden PCPCHs were not supported by the results, which showed that chronic disease
burden levels in PCPCHs did not change after primary care clinics were recognized
as PCPCHs. In terms of average primary care expenditure for high chronic disease
burden PCPCHs, the policy effects (D-in-D) showed some changes in average
primary care expenditures per patient per practice quarter; however, none of the
changes were statistically significant. These results indicated that average primary
care expenditures in PCPCHs did not change after clinics were recognized as
PCPCHs either alone or in comparison to their communities. The results on average
primary care expenditures did not support the hypothesis that primary care expenses
will increase for high chronic disease burden patients in PCPCH based on their
chronic disease burden levels.
For average ED expenditures for high chronic disease burden PCPCHs, the Din-D results indicated that the average increases in ED expenditures per patient per
practice quarter were statistically significant for the high chronic disease burden
PCPCHs in terms of magnitude and percentage relative to average decreases in ED
expenditures for low chronic disease burden PCPCHs, which were statistically
significant, while average ED expenditures for high chronic disease burden PCPCHs
stayed flat. The results do not support the hypothesis that high chronic disease burden
PCPCHs will achieve comparatively higher reductions in ED expenditures.
Similarly, the D-in-D results for IP expenditures for high chronic disease
burden PCPCHs suggest that average IP expenditures increased for high chronic
disease burden PCPCHs in magnitude and were statistically significant in percentage
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terms per patient per practice quarter, but comparatively, average IP expenditures per
patient per practice quarter for the low chronic disease burden PCPCHs did not
change. The results, therefore, do not support the hypothesis that high chronic disease
burden PCPCHs will achieve comparatively higher reductions in IP expenditures. The
results on the additive effects of ED plus IP and ED plus IP plus PC did not show
statistically significant changes, which indicated that average ED plus IP and average
ED plus IP plus PC expenses per patient per practice quarter did not change after
clinics were recognized as PCPCHs either alone or in comparison to their
communities.
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Chapter 5: Discussion
The objective of this research was a relative effectiveness evaluation of the
application of the PCPCH model and approach to primary care in Oregon based on
the chronic disease burden of PCPCHs. PCPCHs were introduced in Oregon as part
of a state-wide health reform initiative that was ushered in by the passage of HB 2009
to improve upstream care through increased access to comprehensive primary care
services and reduce downstream demand for Emergency Department (ED) and
inpatient (IP) utilization and their associated health care expenditures. Based on the
expectation that the model can help reduce ED and IP expenditures and overall health
care costs through improved comprehensive primary care, especially for chronic care
patients, and based on the mixed evidence on reductions in ED and IP expenditures
(Jackson & Williams, 2015; Pikes et al., 2011; Friedberg et al., 2014; Baseman,
Boccuti, Moon, Griffin, & Dutta, 2016), this research was designed to evaluate the
application of PCPCHs with a focus on PCPCH practices that treat greater
proportions of chronic care patients. A step-wise approach was used to help answer
three questions:
1. What is the average chronic disease burden of PCPCHs, and how does
their average chronic disease burden compare to the communities
PCPCHs are in pre-post PCPCH recognition?
2. How do primary care expenditures change based on the chronic disease
burden of PCPCHs?
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3. Do PCPCHs that engage more high chronic disease burden patients have
more reductions in ED and IP expenditures?
A natural experimental design that utilized difference-in-difference methods
was used to measure outcome differences pre-post PCPCH policy implementation
and compare the outcome differences between PCPCHs and their community
comparators. The theoretical perspectives that informed this research were Risk
Selection and Complex Adaptive Systems (CAS). The theory lens postulates that
rational economic agents, including health care delivery systems, that operate in
competitive delivery system environments will adapt to information and other signals
from their environments for competitive advantage and organizational survival. The
theory lens suggests that chronic disease burden levels in clinics that become
PCPCHs will change in response to the policy, program implementation, and
influence changes in short-term outcomes as a result.
This research postulated that the chronic disease burden of PCPCHs will
increase and result in reductions in ED and IP expenditures in the short term because
chronic care patients will receive improved comprehensive primary care services,
which will translate into reductions in the overuse and misuse of ED and IP services.
The remaining sections of this chapter will be organized as follows: discussions of the
results: chronic disease burden levels in PCPCHs, primary care expenditures in
PCPCHs, emergency department and inpatient expenditures in PCPCHs; conclusions
of the research; limitations of the research; implications for policy development;
recommendations for future research.
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Chronic Disease Burden Levels in PCPCHs
This research hypothesized that PCPCHs will initially have chronic disease
burden levels that are equal to their community comparators, but the chronic disease
burden in PCPCHs will be higher after clinics’ recognition as PCPCHs. This
hypothesis was based on the expectation that the model’s emphasis on comprehensive
primary care through improved care coordination, integration, and continuity is
designed to engage and improve care for patients who have chronic physical and
behavioral health conditions. Primary care clinics that become PCPCHs may be
inclined to engage more chronic care patients and provide such patients with
comprehensive primary care services that will reduce their dependence on ED and IP
for primary care services and translate into reductions in ED and IP expenditures.
The results suggest that the chronic disease burden in PCPCHs was
significantly different than their community pre-policy implementation, but the
chronic disease burden in PCPCHs did not change after PCPCH recognition.
Compared to their communities, the chronic disease burden in PCPCHs decreased
after clinics were recognized as PCPCHs by about 0.3 percent, but this change was
not statistically significant; therefore, the null hypothesis that there was no change
was not rejected. The results suggest that primary care clinics that became PCPCHs
did not change the patients they served either alone or with their communities. The
expectation was that PCPCHs would engage more chronic care patients after
recognition.
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Among the likely explanations for this result include the availability of
information for patients to evaluate and determine the benefits of PCPCHs for their
care, and the way patients can identify and switch to PCPCHs for their care. The
results also suggest that some PCPCHs may not have the capacity to engage more
chronic care patients because their environments are fixed. Such clinics may be
operating in communities that predetermine the patient populations from which they
draw. For example, PCPCH practice specialization could predetermine the types of
patients they engage and the chronic disease burden levels of such patients. There
could be other fixed practice level characteristics that help explain why the chronic
disease burden in PCPCHs are not changing.
While the results suggest that the chronic disease burden in PCPCHs and their
communities were similar on most of the markers of chronic disease burden measures
(Table 4.1), they were significantly different on other behavioral health conditions.
This statistically significant difference appears to be the main driver of the difference
between PCPCHs and their communities because they were relatively similar on all
the other markers of chronic disease burden measures. The size of the difference in
other behavioral health conditions is important because PCPCHs are designed to
continuously coordinate and integrate chronic physical and behavioral health care as
part of providing comprehensive primary care services for their patients. Insights into
who these patients are and why they are not engaged in PCPCHs will be important
because the expectation was that PCPCHs would engage such patients.
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Since PCPCHs are not changing the patients they serve, some of the other
behavioral health condition patients who need PCPCH care but are currently not
engaged or receiving PCPCH care may have gaps in their receipt of appropriate care.
This result implies that in some respects, access to and the use of primary care
services may be uneven in unexpected ways for other behavioral health condition
patients. The results on the non-changing chronic disease burden levels in PCPCHs
imply that PCPCHs’ capacity to address such care gaps, i.e. coordinating and
integrating physical and behavioral health care for other behavioral health conditions
patients, may be currently limited. PCPCH practices may therefore need some help to
address such gaps.
The theory of risk selection provides some insights on the results for chronic
disease burden levels in PCPCHs. This theory lens posits that health risks are
heterogeneous, not prized, and unevenly distributed in populations, and due to the
transactions cost associated with separating and pricing health risks, most
reimbursements are based on the average expected cost approach. Since health risks
are not prized, the expectation may not be realistic that PCPCHs will engage high
chronic disease burden patients without well-aligned and explicit incentives,
reimbursements, or accountability metrics to encourage PCPCHs to engage a higher
case mix of chronic disease burden patients. While various alternative payments were
implemented to incentivize PCPCHs to improve care for all patients, most of the
payment incentives were not specifically aligned to incentivize PCPCHs to engage a
higher case mix of chronic care patients. Without well-aligned incentives to
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encourage PCPCHs to engage a higher case mix of chronic care patients, PCPCHs
may choose to focus on engaging a low average case mix of chronic disease burden
patients. However, the results of the research do not suggest evidence on active risk
selection.
The heterogeneity of health risks and the uneven distribution of health risks
suggest that health risks may not be evenly distributed across communities, but they
may be evenly distributed within communities. The chronic disease burden in
PCPCHs, therefore, suggests that PCPCHs are largely like their communities, and the
distribution of the chronic disease burden is similar among primary care providers
within the communities in which PCPCHs are located. The results on chronic disease
burden, i.e. PCPCHs are not changing the chronic disease burden mix of the patients
they are engaging, could be explained by the presence of information asymmetry in
the health care delivery system environment that affects the information patients have
and need to make informed choices about PCPCH providers. Patients would choose
PCPCHs for their care if they have information about the benefits of PCPCH care.
This statement also presumes that high chronic disease burden patients would choose
PCPCHs, but this is not clear. Providing more information about PCPCHs could be
beneficial for patients and helpful for changing the chronic disease burden mix of
PCPCHs in both the short and medium terms.
Primary Care Expenditures in PCPCHs
At the core of the Medical Home (MH) model is the delivery of
comprehensive primary care upstream to create downstream delivery system benefits.
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The model’s emphasis on primary care was to demonstrate the value of primary care,
especially for chronic care patients. Based on the expected benefits of primary care
delivery in PCPCHs, this research tested the hypothesis that average primary care
expenditures will be higher for high average chronic disease burden PCPCHs based
on the expectation that PCPCHs will provide more comprehensive primary care
services to higher average chronic disease burden patients.
The results on average primary care expenditures suggest that primary care
expenditures decreased per patient per practice quarter for low and high chronic
disease burden PCPCHs. However, these changes were not statistically significant;
therefore, the null hypothesis of no changes in primary care expenditures was not
rejected. This conclusion implies that there was no significant difference in primary
care expenditures for high and low chronic disease burden PCPCHs. The hypothesis
that average primary care expenditures will increase for high chronic disease burden
PCPCHs because they will have more high chronic disease burden patients and
provide such patients with more comprehensive primary care services relative to low
chronic disease burden patients was not supported by the results. The results on
primary care expenditures could imply that the levels of primary care services in
PCPCHs are already high, and patients are receiving appropriate primary care
services. Therefore, average primary care services or their associated expenditures did
not change significantly.
Among the conjectures from the results on average primary care expenditures
in PCPCHs are practice level adaptive behaviors that ensured the delivery of effective
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and efficient primary care services based on patients’ health care needs. As a result,
the volume of primary care services may not have changed, but the quality and value
of primary care services may have changed in other important ways that were not the
focus of this research and therefore not measured. For example, Ralston et al. (2009)
and Reid et al. (2009) reported in their evaluations of Medical Homes in Group
Health Cooperatives that in-person primary care utilization decreased while overall
primary care access increased through secure phone and email communications.
Health care utilization decreased by 29 percent as a result, but the quality of care
remained the same.
Emergency Department and Inpatient Expenditures in PCPCHs
The construct of improving primary care services upstream to reduce
downstream demand for ED and IP has been used consistently to describe the
contributions of Medical Homes to delivery systems improvement. While this
relationship appears intuitive, the research evidence is mixed on improvements in ED
and IP utilization, especially for chronic care patients. Based on this knowledge, this
research tested the hypothesis that PCPCHs will achieve higher average reductions in
ED and IP expenditures after recognition based on the expectation that patients with
higher average chronic disease burden will have greater response to upstream primary
care services that translate into decreases in average ED and IP expenditures
downstream.
The results on average ED expenditures suggest that average expenditure
increases per patient per practice quarter for high chronic disease burden PCPCHs
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were statistically significant in magnitude and percentage relative to average ED
expenditure decreases per patient per practice quarter for low chronic disease burden
PCPCHs that were statistically significant, while expenditures for high chronic
disease burden PCPCH patients remained flat. The results do not support the
hypothesis that ED expenditures will decrease for high chronic disease burden
PCPCHs. The results could imply that high chronic disease burden patients may have
less overuse and misuse of ED expenditures to relinquish in the short term because of
their health conditions and need for such services. Low chronic disease burden
patients, on the other hand, may have more overuse and misuse of ED and IP to
relinquish as reflected in the average changes in expenditures by the different chronic
disease burden groups.
The results suggesting that the largest decreases in average ED expenditures
per patient per practice quarter were from low chronic disease burden PCPCHs imply
that focusing on low chronic disease burden patients in PCPCHs may help reduce the
inappropriate utilization of ED services and their associated expenditures. Similarly,
the results on IP expenditures suggest that average IP expenditures increased
significantly in rate of change for high chronic disease burden PCPCHs compared to
low chronic disease burden PCPCHs. The results on ED and IP expenditures do not
support the hypothesis that high chronic disease burden PCPCHs will achieve higher
average reductions in ED and IP expenditures than before PCPCH recognition.
The results on the additive effects of the changes in average ED, IP, and PC
for high chronic disease burden PCPCHs reflect the results on their individual effects.
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Other research confirms the mixed results for ED and IP utilization for high chronic
disease burden patients (Dorr, Wilcox, Brunker, Burdon, & Donnelly, 2008; Jackson
et al., 2013; Friedberg et al., 2014). Based on the results from comparing high and
low chronic disease burden PCPCHs, it can be argued that the expectations that high
chronic disease burden PCPCHs will reduce ED and IP expenditures and exert
downward pressure on health care costs were not supported. The results do suggest
that the distribution of chronic disease burden in PCPCHs is important for the
evaluation of ED and IP expenditures in the short term, but in the opposite direction
than expected. Focusing on low and medium chronic disease burden patients may
help reduce ED and IP expenditures in the short and medium terms.
The relatively different results on average ED and IP expenditure reductions
for high versus low average chronic disease burden PCPCHs confirm generally the
mixed evidence in the literature on ED and IP expenditure reductions, and
specifically from high chronic disease burden patients. The results also suggest that
the interrelationships between the health conditions of patients in PCPCHs, the care
such patients receive in PCPCHs, and how their care translates into ED and IP
utilization and expenditures may be more complex than initially conceived by this
research. The expectation by proponents of the model that providing improved
upstream care could translate into reductions in ED and IP utilization and
expenditures downstream may be ambitious and need refinement and further insights
based on the evolving evidence from the model’s applications.
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The results on ED and IP expenditures could be explained from the
perspective of CAS, which suggests that health care delivery in PCPCHs may have
complex equilibria based on the different health conditions of patients and
interactions in their environments (Holden, 2005). Because patients are
heterogeneous in their health conditions, they will likely have different health care
service needs and interact differently with existing and new health care delivery
structures for their service needs. The outcomes of patients’ interactions with the
different health service structures may be different as well. The complexity of
patients’ health needs, the choices they make to pursue health care, and the
interactions in the health system environment that impact patients and the outcomes
of their care may not be fully understood.
Our expectations of the process and outcomes of PCPCH care, especially for
chronic care patients, may need to evolve based on the emerging evidence. For
example, the expectation that PCPCHs could help reduce ED and IP expenditures
assumed that the overuse and misuse of ED and IP utilization would be higher for
high chronic disease burden patients; therefore, engaging high chronic disease burden
patients in PCPCHs could help reduce such inappropriate utilization. But the results
suggest the opposite. The overuse and misuse of ED and IP utilization may be higher
for low chronic disease burden patients. Engaging low chronic disease burden
patients in PCPCHs, therefore, may help reduce average ED and IP expenditures
because low chronic disease burden patients may have more inappropriate use to
relinquish. High chronic disease burden patients, on the other hand, may have higher
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ED and IP use because they need such care, which can be considered appropriate
(versus inappropriate) use of ED and IP services.
The results on average ED and IP expenditures per patient per practice quarter
for high chronic disease burden PCPCHs also suggest that expenditures are not
decreasing at the same proportion as low chronic disease burden PCPCHs, but they
are not increasing at a higher proportion either (expenditures were unchanged). Based
on the expectation that high chronic disease burden patients will need and use ED and
IP services because of their health status, the emphasis may need to be on the efficient
and effective utilization of ED, IP, and other non-ED and IP health care services by
high chronic disease burden patients in PCPCHs. From this perspective, it can be
argued that the results suggesting that average ED and IP expenditures for high
chronic disease burden PCPCHs did not change, should be expected, because PCPCH
patients may have effectively and efficiently used ED and IP services.
This research stratified PCPCHs into high and low chronic disease burden
groups based on the chronic disease burden levels of their patients. The different
results on average ED and IP expenditures suggest that there may be some inherent
differences with the comparison of PCPCHs based on the high and low chronic
disease burden groupings, or some misunderstanding of the complexity of the care
transformations for high and low chronic disease burden patients or high and low
chronic disease burden PCPCHs. Reviewing the appropriate comparators to use for
the high and low groups may help capture the unobserved or poorly understood
differences in the high and low chronic disease burden patient populations or the high
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and low chronic disease burden PCPCHs. Furthermore, the development and use of
the chronic disease burden as a proxy health risk measure for this research assumed
that high average chronic disease burden patients are homogenous. However, the
results suggest that high average chronic disease burden patients in PCPCHs may be
different. The theory of CAS suggests that high average chronic disease burden
patients in PCPCHs may interact or be associated with different and complex
environmental factors in different ways that lead to complex outcome paths.
The results in Tables 4.1 and 4.3 on the characteristics of patients in PCPCHs
and high chronic disease burden patients suggest that these patients represent a larger
proportion of Medicaid enrollees and a larger variation of age groups. This discovery
suggests that there could be some unobserved and unmeasured differences in the
social determinants of health for these patients that may be impacting the results on
average ED and IP expenditures. Also, figure 3.1 shows the scope of social
determinates of health including economic, neighborhood, environment, and
education, their interactions, and their potential impacts on access to health care and
potentially, the use of ED and IP especially for Medicaid patients. Differences in
social determinants of health such as health literacy, healthy foods, poverty, access to
shelter, and the availability and reliability of transportation have been found to impact
continuous access to healthcare services including medication adherence, and health
outcomes. Starfield, Shi & Macinko (2005), Goodman et al. (2003), and Cowling et
al. (2013) suggested that differences in social determinants of health have impacts on
ED and IP utilization and expenditures. Further insights into the unobserved and
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unmeasured differences in the social determinants of health for high chronic disease
burden patients in PCPCHs could help explain their utilization of ED, IP, and other
services.
Conclusions
Based on the expectation that PCPCHs’ approach to care would engage more
high chronic disease burden patients and improve the outcomes of care for such
patients, this research tested the hypotheses that the relative effectiveness of PCPCHs
to reduce ED and IP expenditures would depend on engaging high chronic disease
burden patients, providing such patients with increased PC services upstream that
translate into decreases in average ED and IP expenditures downstream. The results
of the research did not support the hypotheses but suggested that the distribution of
chronic disease burden in PCPCHs is important for evaluating the relative
effectiveness of the application of the model, but in the opposite direction than
expected. The distribution of the chronic disease burden in PCPCHs impacted the
magnitude and rate of decreases in average ED and IP expenditures in the short term.
This insight is important for policy-related decisions in PCPCHs and for future
research because low chronic disease burden patients in PCPCHs achieved more ED
and IP savings compared to high chronic disease burden patients in PCPCHs, whose
expenditures stayed flat.
The results suggest that the chronic disease burden in PCPCHs was
unchanged after primary care clinics’ recognition as PCPCHs even though it was
assumed that the chronic disease burden would increase. This suggests that PCPCHs
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are not changing the types of patients they serve, even if they are changing the care
they provide to their patients. Table 4.1 on the characteristics of PCPCH patients
suggests that there are statistically significant differences in the proportions of other
behavioral health conditions patients in PCPCHs and the community: 23.4 percent
versus 30.5 percent, respectively. This result is important because part of the
organization of care in PCPCHs is based on the effective coordination and integration
of care across the care continuum for physical and behavioral health conditions
patients. The difference in the proportion of other behavioral health patients in
PCPCHs suggests that some of these patients who may need and can benefit from the
PCPCH approach to care are not engaged in PCPCHs. Further research into who
these patients are, why they are not engaged in PCPCHs, and how they can be
engaged will provide important insights into the application of the model.
Average PC expenditures per patient per practice quarter for high chronic
disease burden PCPCHs relative to low chronic disease burden PCPCHs did not
change after policy implementation, but the hypothesis was that PC expenditures for
high chronic disease burden PCPCHs would increase because clinics would engage
more high chronic disease burden patients who need and use more PC services. One
conjecture from this result is that both high and low chronic disease burden PCPCHs
provided effective and efficient PC services, and PC services may have changed in
other ways that were not the focus of this research and therefore not measured.
Average ED and IP expenditures per patient per practice quarter for high
chronic disease burden PCPCHs did not change in terms of magnitude or percentage
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relative to average ED and IP expenditures for low chronic disease burden PCPCHs,
but average expenditures per patient per practice quarter for low chronic disease
burden PCPCHs decreased while average expenditures for high chronic disease
burden PCPCHs stayed flat. It can be inferred from these results that average ED and
IP expenditures per patient per practice quarter for high chronic disease burden
PCPCHs did not decrease as expected compared to low chronic disease burden
PCPCHs. Therefore, focusing on low chronic disease burden PCPCHs could help
achieve the expected reductions in average ED and IP expenditures in the short term.
These results imply that chronic disease burden levels in PCPCHs are important for
evaluating the relative effectiveness of the model’s application because the
distribution of the chronic disease burden in PCPCHs impacted average ED and IP
utilization and savings. Stratifying PCPCHs into high average and low average
chronic disease burden PCPCHs provided important insights into ED and IP
expenditures by high average and low average chronic disease burden groups.
Furthermore, the results suggest that current knowledge on the performance of
PCPCHs may not capture the dynamic interactions of the model’s application. The
different results on average ED and IP expenditures by high and low average chronic
disease burden PCPCHs suggest that the interrelationships among the health status of
patients in PCPCHs and specific PCPCH effects, such as the type of care patients
receive and how such care translates into decreases in ED and IP utilization and
expenditures, may be more complex than initially envisioned by this research. The
expectation by proponents of the model that providing improved upstream care would
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translate into reductions in ED and IP utilization and expenditures downstream may
need further refinement based on the evolving evidence from the model’s application
in different delivery systems.
The approach to constructing the chronic disease burden measure and
stratifying the chronic disease burden measure into high average and low average
chronic disease burden PCPCHs assumed that patients are homogenous within
chronic disease burden levels; therefore, high or low chronic disease burden patients
in high average chronic disease burden PCPCHs resemble high or low chronic disease
burden patients in low average chronic disease burden PCPCHs. However, the
relatively different results on the average ED and IP expenditures per patient per
practice quarter for high average chronic disease burden PCPCHs suggest that there
may be some unobserved differences in the health system environment of these
PCPCHs that interact with patient chronic disease burden, or with the patients
themselves, and distinguishes them from patients in other PCPCHs.
The proportion of Medicaid patients in the high chronic disease burden
PCPCH group suggests that the differences may be related to higher social
determinants of health and related health systems deficiencies (displayed and
explained in figure 3.1) that impact average ED and IP utilization and expenditures
for patients in high average chronic disease burden PCPCHs. The use of the chronic
disease burden measure and the approach to matching and comparing high and low
chronic disease burden PCPCHs in this research did not envision or measure the
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different effects of the dynamic interactions in the environments of high and low
chronic disease burden PCPCHs.
It can be inferred from the results of this research that the complex
interactions in the health care delivery system environment in which PCPCHs operate
and the effects of such complexity on expected outcomes may not have been
anticipated by proponents of the model or adjusted for in their expectations. The
differences in outcomes, the actual and expected, could be attributed to the initial
expectations about the model’s application. Crabtree et al. (2011) observed from
historical evidence on primary care transformation that improving outcomes of care is
complicated and may only be achieved from “major changes to the interdependent
relationships among agents” (p. S30). This insight suggests that PCPCHs may not be
able to engage all high chronic disease burden patients in ways that result in
significant and sustainable decreases in average ED and IP utilization and
expenditures because some high average chronic disease burden patients live in
different or difficult social environments that have limited health system support
beyond PCPCHs; such patients may therefore need and use ED and IP services
accordingly.
Limitations of the Research
Based on the design of this research, the sources of data, and the results,
several limitations emerged. The main limitations include the definition of
community, the use of PCPCHs as the unit of analysis, matching and comparing high
and low chronic disease burden PCPCHs to their control groups, and the use of the
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chronic disease burden measure as a proxy measure for health risks. This research
evaluated the chronic disease burden of PCPCHs and their effects on specific
outcomes; the results, therefore, constitute practice-level instead of individual-level
effects. The individual results are also different from an overall evaluation of the
PCPCH program. Since PCPCHs may have different patient population sizes across
different practices, the average effects (changes) may be very different among
practices than on individual patients. The use of PCPCHs as the unit of analysis for
this research was important for determining the policy effects of the application of the
model. The results on the average changes in PCPCHs are therefore different from the
results that would be obtained from an evaluation of the overall effects of the PCPCH
program, which would have been based on weighting the number of individuals who
are receiving primary care services in PCPCHs.
Primary care communities in this research were defined more narrowly than
the Office of Rural Health Policy (2016) in Oregon’s definition of primary care
service areas, which are “contiguous ZIP codes within specified primary care service
areas” (p. 3). This research constructed community comparators through case
matching patients’ ZIP codes, age, gender, and health insurance types. This approach
to creating community comparators helped match and compare high and low average
chronic disease burden PCPCH clinics to comparators based on the types of patients
served in their respective community locations. This matching approach assumed that
patients are homogenous within high average and low average chronic disease burden
practices; therefore, high and low chronic disease burden patients in PCPCHs would
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reflect the PCPCHs’ communities. The results, however, suggest that high and low
chronic disease burden PCPCHs do not currently reflect the communities in which
they operate.
This research compared the chronic disease burden on three levels: (1) high
average chronic disease burden PCPCHs to low average chronic disease burden
PCPCHs, (2) low average chronic disease burden PCPCHs to their low average
community comparators, and (3) high average chronic disease burden PCPCHs to
their high average community comparators. However, the results of the research
suggest that this approach to comparing PCPCHs (high average chronic disease
burden PCPCHs to low average chronic disease burden PCPCHs) may have affected
the outcomes achieved. Additionally, the use of the All Payer All Claims (APAC)
secondary data system-imposed limitations because the data omitted many health risk
scores for patients whose conditions were not yet considered high risk because their
health care episodes had not reached chronic thresholds for generating health risk
scores.
A chronic disease burden measure was therefore developed and used as a
proxy health risk measure for this research. This chronic disease burden measure was
limited because it was based on 10 variable markers of chronic conditions that were
available in the APAC data. Other studies have used similar measures on patients’
chronic conditions as proxy health risk measures (Ash et al., 2000; Hornbrook &
Goodman, 1996), but while health risk scores and the number of patients’ chronic
conditions are similar, they produced relatively different results in several ways. As
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measures of health risks, risk scores are more comprehensive than chronic conditions;
they have more predictive power because they include more variables that help
comprehensively evaluate current and future health risks.
This research is also a short-term study that focused on measuring the effects
of high and low average chronic disease burden in PCPCHs on a limited set of
outcome variables that are used by policymakers in policy decision-making. The
results were based on data on the first wave of PCPCH attestation from October 2011
through September 2014, but PCPCH attestation data collection at the practice level
has improved since the first wave of data collection. The model has also been
implemented more broadly across the state over time. The results of this research may
not capture such improvements and may also have limited generalizability because
they are exclusive to the application of Oregon’s PCPCH model.
Implications for Policy Development
This research evaluated the relative effectiveness of the application of
PCPCHs with a focus on high chronic disease burden patients to determine whether
engaging high chronic disease burden patients in PCPCHs decreased average ED and
IP expenditures. The results of this research have some implications for PCPCH
policy development, specifically for broad policy development on the applications of
the model.
The results suggest that focusing on chronic conditions of patients in PCPCHs
is important for evaluating the relative effectiveness of the model’s application
because decreases in average ED and IP expenditures per patient per practice quarter
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were impacted by the distribution of the chronic disease burden in PCPCHs.
Decreases in average ED and IP expenditures per patient per practice quarter were
comparatively greater for low average chronic disease burden PCPCHs, suggesting
that lower chronic disease burden PCPCHs may be associated to greater ED and IP
savings. This insight is important for policy-related decisions in PCPCHs.
Specifically, to reduce short-term ED and IP expenditures in PCPCHs, policies must
focus on the distribution of chronic conditions among patients in PCPCHs. The
implementation of policies that focus on the engagement of a broader pool of patients
in PCPCHs or policies that encourage PCPCH clinics to attract and engage a broader
pool of chronic conditions patients, instead of policies that emphasize focusing on
high chronic disease burden patients, could improve the relative effectiveness of the
model’s application to reduce downstream health care utilization and expenditures.
Policies for aligning payer incentives in PCPCHs to reduce inappropriate use
(overuse and misuse) of ED and IP and expenditures can be improved based on the
results of this research. The results suggest that incentives that narrowly focus on high
chronic disease burden patients or higher average chronic disease burden PCPCHs
may not achieve the expected short-term decreases in average ED and IP utilization
and expenditures because the savings accrue from engaging a low chronic disease
burden mix of patients. Payment policies that focus on high chronic disease burden
patients could have unintended consequences, such as high chronic disease burden
PCPCHs appearing ineffective in the short term while low chronic disease burden
PCPCHs appear very effective in the short term. Such approaches to the design of
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payment policies could create adverse incentives for high chronic disease burden
PCPCHs to focus on engaging low chronic disease burden patients for short-term
benefits.
The use of differential payment incentives could help reduce these unintended
effects. Such payment policies could use differential payment scales, for example,
rewarding clinics that achieve savings from engaging low chronic disease burden
patients less than clinics that achieve savings from engaging high chronic disease
burden patients. PCPCH payment incentives should be risk-adjusted. The use of
various risk-adjusted payment mechanisms can help improve the value and efficiency
of care, reduce the incentives for attracting and engaging low chronic disease burden
patients, and increase the average chronic disease burden of PCPCH clinics. Incentive
policies that focus on broadening the chronic disease burden mix of PCPCHs
specifically, and all Medical Homes in general, could also help reduce average ED
and IP expenditures and discourage potential active-risk selection practices.
Proponents of the model expected that high chronic disease burden patients
would be engaged in PCPCHs because of the patient-centered approaches to
coordinating and integrating care for high chronic disease burden patients (Peikes et
al., 2011; Rittenhouse, Thom, & Schmittdiel, 2010). The results of this research,
however, suggest that average chronic disease burden levels in PCPCHs did not
change after PCPCH recognition, implying that PCPCHs are not changing the types
of patients they engage. This result has broad policy implications in terms of the types
of policies to enact, and the ability of such policies to influence or change where
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people seek their health care services. At the patient level, policies to educate high
chronic disease burden patients about the benefits of PCPCH care, resources to guide
such patients on how to identify and choose PCPCHs, and incentives to encourage
specifically high chronic disease burden patients (and all patients in general) to enroll
in PCPCHs may be important.
At the provider level, educating patients about seeking care in PCPCHs and
the benefits of such care, using patient navigators to help engage and enroll patients,
and sponsoring health promotion campaigns in the community locations of PCPCHs
may help identify and enroll a broader mix of chronic care patients in PCPCHs. At
the system level, recognizing more primary care clinics as PCPCHs across different
regions of the state and providing more technical assistance on PCPCH attestation to
support smaller primary care clinics that are either going through the process of
PCPCH recognition or want to become PCPCHs will help improve access and
provide more choices for patients. Additionally, policies to reduce co-pays or
deductibles for high and low chronic disease burden patients who seek care in
PCPCHs may be important for engaging a broader mix of chronic disease burden
patients who can benefit from PCPCH care. Such policies would help engage more
high chronic disease burden patients and lead to lower inappropriate ED and IP
utilizations and expenditures.
The results on average ED and IP expenditures for high chronic disease
burden PCPCHs raise the possibility of unobserved differences in the environments
of high chronic disease burden patients in PCPCHs. The characteristics of high
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chronic disease burden patients in PCPCHs suggest that such unobserved differences
may be based on the higher social determinants of health and related factors (shown
figure 3.1) that exists in the environment for higher chronic disease burden patients in
PCPCHs. Policies and incentives to support PCPCHs’ approach to care may need to
be specifically tailored to the types of PCPCHs, the communities where they operate,
and the patients they engage because high average chronic disease burden PCPCHs
may need additional or different support systems than low chronic disease burden
PCPCHs.
Recommendations for Further Research
This research evaluated the levels of chronic condition-based health risks in
PCPCHs to determine the engagement of patients who have high health risks in
PCPCHs and to determine whether high average chronic disease burden PCPCHs
achieve more savings from decreases in average ED and IP expenditures. The results
imply that the distribution of chronic conditions of patients in PCPCHs is important
and related to savings in ED and IP expenditures, but in different ways than expected.
Further research to understand the application of PCPCHs and the relative
effectiveness of the applications of the model will be needed.
While the chronic disease burden in PCPCHs did not change after the
recognition of clinics as PCPCHs, the proportion of other behavioral health patients
in PCPCHs was low compared to the community. Since PCPCHs are designed to
coordinate and integrate care for physical and behavioral health patients as part of
delivering comprehensive primary care services, the results indicating that the
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proportion of other behavioral health patients in PCPCHs was significantly lower
than the community are important. Research to determine the characteristics of such
patients, their care preferences, and reasons they are not engaged in PCPCHs will
provide insights into appropriate ways to engage such patients in PCPCHs. Such
research can also help inform how PCPCHs can effectively engage other chronic
condition patients who can benefit from the PCPCH approach to coordinating and
integrating primary care services upstream.
Since coordinated care organizations (CCOs) were expected to mobilize and
direct patients to receive coordinated and integrated care in PCPCHs, further research
on patients’ health care preferences, especially high chronic disease burden patients,
may help improve existing knowledge on patient engagement, the preferences of such
patients for PCPCH care, the different systems and mechanisms for engaging such
patients, and the relative effectiveness of existing systems for engaging patients.
The focus of this research on the levels of chronic conditions in PCPCHs,
based on their patients, assumed the measurement of chronic disease burden would be
the same at the PCPCH practice level and the individual patient level; therefore,
aggregating chronic conditions in PCPCHs would be adequate. Since different
PCPCHs have different proportions of patients, though, their chronic disease burden
may be different at the PCPCH and individual patient levels. The results also suggest
that there may be unobserved heterogeneity in chronic disease burden levels. For
example, the characteristics of high chronic disease burden patients, i.e. more
Medicaid patients and of varying ages, suggest that high average chronic disease
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burden PCPCHs may be different based on unobserved differences in the higher
social determinants of health for the patients who receive care in high average chronic
disease burden PCPCHs. These unmeasured differences may have impacted the
results on average ED and IP expenditures for high average chronic disease burden
PCPCHs. Further research focus on measuring these unobserved differences and
evaluating their differential effects on the PCPCH approach to care as well as ED and
IP utilization and expenditures will help improve existing knowledge on the
applications of the model for this population group.
The results also suggest the need for further studies into the classifications of
appropriate and inappropriate care for high and low chronic disease burden patients in
PCPCHs. From the results, savings from average ED and IP expenditures were
comparatively greater for low average chronic disease burden patients in PCPCHs,
but the expectation was that savings would be greater for higher average chronic
disease burden patients in PCPCHs. Further research on what constitutes appropriate
and inappropriate care in the receipt of primary care services by high and low chronic
disease burden patients, and how changes in the receipt of such health care services
translates into downstream decreases in ED and IP use and savings, will be important.
Future research can also focus on measuring the differences in social determinants of
health and other potentially unmeasured factors that affect the engagement of patients
in PCPCHs and savings from ED and IP expenditures. The results of such research
will help improve existing knowledge on the model as well as our understanding of
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the relative effectiveness of the model’s application in the current delivery system
environment.
A reflection on the methods used and the unexpected research results suggests
the use of other methods to determine whether they provide different results. For
example, the use of different comparators could provide different contexts for
interpreting the research results. The comparison of high average chronic disease
burden PCPCHs to low average chronic disease burden PCPCHs (to determine
relative decreases in average ED and IP expenditures by the different chronic disease
burden groups) suggests some misunderstanding of the trajectories of care
transformation for high and low chronic disease burden patients in PCPCHs. For high
chronic disease burden patients in PCPCHs, the results that ED and IP expenditures
did not change may be preferable in terms of inappropriate utilization.
The results on higher savings from low average chronic disease burden
patients further suggest that low chronic disease burden patients in PCPCHs may
have more inappropriate use of ED and IP than expected. Using different
comparators, such as comparing high average chronic disease burden PCPCHs to
comparable high average chronic disease burden comparators rather than comparing
high and low average chronic disease burden PCPCH practices, may provide better
contexts for the results and contribute to existing knowledge on what constitutes
appropriate and inappropriate ED and IP utilization for high average and low average
chronic disease burden patients in PCPCHs. Such research will also improve existing
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knowledge by helping to clarify the use of and accounting for ED and IP utilization
and expenditures in PCPCHs.
The focus of this research on chronic conditions in PCPCHs assumed that the
delivery of comprehensive primary care services in PCPCHs for high chronic disease
burden patients (upstream care) would translate into increased primary care use,
increased primary care expenditures upstream, and savings from reduced ED and IP
utilization downstream. However, the results suggested that ED and IP use and
expenditures for high chronic disease burden patients in PCPCHs remained flat, while
primary care use and expenditures did not change. Since chronic care patients have
complex health care needs and may interact differently with different sections of the
delivery system, including their need for and benefits from referrals to specialty care,
evaluating the use and expenditures for specialty care services by high and low
chronic disease burden PCPCH patients could provide a broader context for
interpreting the research results. Chronic care patients in PCPCHs may need and use
chronic disease management, and it is expected that effective chronic disease
management in PCPCHs could reduce their need and use of specialty care services.
Insights into the use and expenditures for specialty services by chronic care patients
in PCPCHs could provide another dimension for contextualizing the results of this
research as well as evaluating the relative effectiveness of chronic disease
management in PCPCHs.
The design and use of a chronic disease burden measure for this research was
intended to additionally help determine whether the chronic conditions of PCPCH
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patients was a stable measure for evaluating the relative effectiveness of the model’s
application. The results suggesting the distribution of chronic conditions in PCPCHs
is important and related to outcomes provide a foundation for further exploratory
research into the relative effectiveness of the different applications of PCPCHs, for
example, using the chronic disease burden measure for evaluating the distribution of
chronic conditions in different PCPCH tier practices, different PCPCH geographic
locations and regions, and different specialties of the model’s application. Such
evaluations could provide further insights into the different applications of the
PCPCH model, the levels of chronic conditions, and the relative effectiveness of the
different applications as well as the process to appropriately align payment incentives
to increase the engagement of a broader mix of chronic care patients in the different
applications of the model.
While the design and use of the chronic disease burden measure provided
flexibility to stratify PCPCH clinics into high and low groups to determine utilization
and expenditures by the high and low groups, the different results on ED and IP use
and expenditures compel the need for further insights on the chronic disease burden
measure to determine the potential weight of each of the ten markers of chronic
conditions in the chronic disease burden measure and the strength of association
between the markers of chronic conditions and ED and IP use and expenditures. Such
insights could be useful for aligning payment incentives for PCPCHs to improve care
for patients whose specific chronic conditions predispose them to increased ED and
IP utilization and expenditures.
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The design of this research can be improved in other areas as well. The use of
different health risk measures that are more comprehensive, can determine current
and future health risks, reflect the appropriate utilization (reducing overuse and
misuse) of ED and IP instead of the overall utilization of ED and IP; or the use of
other measures that are more sensitive to ED and IP utilizations and expenditures may
help to improve the results of this research. This research was designed as a shortterm relative effectiveness evaluation based on data constraints. The availability of
more data over time can help undertake a more comprehensive longitudinal study to
determine chronic disease burden levels in PCPCHs in the medium to long terms and
their association to reducing ED and IP expenditures.
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